Grassroots Governance and Political Engagement in Community Organizations

by

Deanna A. Kolberg-Shah

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
2021

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Allen Hicken, Chair
Professor Jeremy Levine
Professor Brian Min
Professor Noah Nathan

Deanna A. Kolberg-Shah
dkolberg@umich.edu
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3113-3717

Dedicated to my family for their support
&
a los samarios por enseñarme el poder de la acción comunal.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Numerous people generously supported me with their time, mentorship, and friendship during this long process.

First, I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Allen Hicken for providing me moral support, constant helpful feedback, and pushing me to clarify my ideas and believe in my contribution. Dr. Noah Nathan sparked an early interest in political behavior through his seminar and his feedback on countless half-baked prospectus ideas helped me to hone an argument and research design that could contribute to academic discourse. Dr. Brian Min encouraged me to follow my strengths in collecting rich qualitative data and helped me see the value in the stories I had collected. My dissertation would not have the same level of nuance on issues of normativity and subjectivity without the help of Dr. Jeremy Levine. I am forever grateful for their mentorship, time and encouragement.

I had the pleasure of bouncing ideas off of an amazing group of comparativist graduate students at the University Michigan, including Tom O'Mealia, Mike Thompson, Yuequan Guo, Megan Ryan, Peter Carroll, Eitan Paul, Roya Talibova, Sasha

de Vogel and many others. Coffee breaks with Hwayong Shin, Emily Sabo, and Danielle Labotka provided the motivation and encouragement I needed to keep moving forward. The help and support of my many friends in Ann Arbor made the graduate student experience more enjoyable.

This dissertation would lack all of the rich contextual data from Magdalena were it not for my research assistant and friend, Arianna De Luque. Her insights were invaluable throughout the process and her encouragement when faced with the complexities of local politics motivated me to finish the dissertation even when I felt like giving up. Hundreds of *samarios* sat with us on porches and street corners to share their experience with politics and public services in peripheral neighborhoods, and hundreds of social leaders patiently explained how they addressed social problems in their communities. Bureaucrats in the local affairs office in the city of Santa Marta taught me the formal and informal systems of communal action, and shared with me their tireless desire to make neighborhoods better through grassroots engagement. I could not have understood this context without the time they generously shared with me.

The work of collecting dissertation data required financial support from the University of Michigan's Political Science department, the Rackham International Research Award, the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies, the Latin American and Caribbean Studies department, and the Chandler family. Their generous

support allowed me to compensate my research assistants fairly and gave me the time I needed in Colombia to develop and implement the research featured in the dissertation.

Finally, I want to thank my husband, Niral Shah, and our family for supporting me in this endeavor, helping format tables, compiling datasets, visiting me in Colombia, helping me think through ideas, proof-reading grant applications, celebrating with me during the highs, and comforting me through the lows. I truly could not have done this without their support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

LIST OF TABLES

Table

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix

ABSTRACT

Grassroots leaders act as a bridge between poor communities and the services they deserve. Electoral mobilization provides an opportunity for neighborhoods to get access to resources from outside the community that they can use for development projects, community events, and assistance accessing state services. Yet, communities employ very different tactics to achieve their development goals and some communities are better able to leverage their vote record for resources than others. My dissertation explores grassroots neighborhood politics in three parts using data from *Juntas de Accíon Comunal* (CAB) records, surveys, and original interviews in Colombia. The dissertation fills important gaps in the literature on clientelism, local politics, and community development by providing a theoretical framework to understand community leader motivations and applications to the Colombian context. The typology in Chapter 2 highlights institutional diversity in community brokers that can help explain contradictory findings in the clientelism literature, backed by in-depth interviews and survey results with social leaders from the mountains and lowlands in Colombia's Caribbean coast. In the third chapter, I utilize surveys and interviews with CAB presidents in Santa Marta, Colombia to demonstrate the connection between social leader elections

and leader choices when acting as political brokers. While democratic elections for community leaders may have other normative benefits, they often push leaders to acquire funding for projects through mobilizing voters in support of candidates for public office, even at the expense of undesirable candidate characteristics like corruption records. The final chapter explores how community leaders signal the strength of their vote bloc at polling places using spatial maps of CAB neighborhood headquarters and results from the 2018 Senate race in Bogotá, Colombia. I introduce a new way of thinking about broker monitorability at the polling station level and find that polling places with more dense brokerage networks are more competitive and are more likely to see votes for down-ballot candidates that lack name recognition, suggesting that CAB leaders are actively mobilizing voters in dense neighborhoods in direct contrast with expectations in existing literature.

CHAPTER I

Introduction

In Colombia, neighborhood governance collectives called *Juntas de Acción Comunal* (Communal Action Boards or CABs in English) provide a formal link between communities and municipal governments and an informal link between voters and candidates for public office. Elected CAB leaders increase state legibility (Scott, 1998) by collecting demographic data and community concerns and presenting them in a systematic legible format to the municipal government. They also often perform brokerage work for political parties and candidates due to their prominence in neighborhood civil society. Leaders acting as intermediaries translate deep contextual knowledge to scale for both the state and politicians, but balance both these tasks with their own desire to maintain community goodwill and be re-elected themselves.

In my dissertation I address the complex nature of these grassroots actors by first providing a holistic overview of their roles and responsibilities in the communities where they work and the wealth of diversity in the forms these institutions take

as a response to their environment. I then delve into how mechanisms of accountability can constrain leader-as-broker behavior to promote public goods provision during elections, but may in turn perversely affect the type of political candidates that end up in legislative positions. I follow this with an in-depth look at the density of grassroots leaders and their impact on polling place voter outcomes in Senate elections in Bogotá. The dissertation closes with avenues for future work.

I employ a thoroughly mixed-methods approach to understanding these important local institutions. My dissertation's central arguments came out of inductive exploratory field work beginning with a year-long stay in Colombia where I focused on listening and shifting my research in response to local conditions. Neighborhoods as a unit of analysis present challenges to traditional quantitative inference because we tend to lack standardized data at this granular of a level. In response, I collected my own dataset of interviews with 192 communal action board leaders, a discrete-choice experiment that succinctly measures how local leaders choose who to endorse as a candidate for public office and spatial mappings of communal action boards across Colombia's capital city.

Each chapter of the dissertation contributes to a growing and dynamic literature on how people connect with politicians through brokers - a catch-all term for individuals who link candidates for public office with the supporters they need for election. Chapter one provides a framework on the types of constraints different

brokers face that helps interpret conflicting findings in the clientelism literature. Chapter two complicates previous findings that accountabilty for brokers promotes local development by showing how social leader elections perpetuate brokerage relationships at the expense of clean political candidates. Chapter three contributes to work exploring the density of brokers and challenges existing conceptualizations of how politicians monitor broker performance.

Who are Communal Action Board Leaders and What do they Do?

Juntas de Acción Comunal (CABs or *Juntas*) were created in Colombia during the 1950s with the specific purpose of augmenting the reach of the state in the aftermath of *La Violencia* - a violent civil war. Internal displacement during *La Violencia* accelerated the pace of urbanization in Colombia, and the national government sub-contracted local social leaders to disseminate and collect information in the newly settled areas.[1] Up to 30% of the country's local infrastructure projects were requested and directed by communal action boards and the country has around 45,000 officially registered boards active today (Ministerio del Interior, 2019). In the past three years alone, however, 462 social leaders have been assassinated, which has decreased the activism of junta leaders in their communities and greatly disrupted their ability to connect often poor residents to necessary state services. Particularly in rural areas that were previously controlled by armed groups, communal leaders have a stigma of association with guerrilla or paramil-

[1]This process often involved encroaching upon indigenous territory. Today indigenous groups in Colombia have unique indigenous leadership structures rather than communal action boards.

itary forces and development actors in some sectors eschewed working with CAB leaders due to rumors of corruption and local community mistrust (Schwab, 2017).

Juntas de Acción Comunal in Colombia range from near total substitutes for the state in remote areas of the country to little more than "*Juntas de Papeles*".[2] Their official functions and responsibilities include expansive governance roles like identifying and addressing community needs, spreading information about public initiatives, helping community members access state services, serving as conflict resolution mechanisms, organizing labor for community development initiatives, and even denouncing human rights abuses to state authorities (Vargas, 2019). In practice, communal action board leaders in my field site, Santa Marta, spend much of their time solving problems for local residents, hosting block parties, and generating donations and labor to fix collective neighborhood issues like potholes and drainage pipes.

In most municipalities, the city government allocates a certain amount of money each year to fund communal action board activities and fund development projects through block grants. The national Ministry of the Interior also provides some grants and loans. CABs tend to be the most active in lower-income and informal neighborhoods where the need for self-governance and government intervention is the most acute.

[2]Interview with Municipal Affairs Office Staff in Santa Marta, October 2019

Local leaders substitute for weak state capacity through collecting and disseminating information at the grassroots level (Auerbach, 2016; Read, 2012). For example, elected neighborhood association presidents in Colombia help residents navigate bureaucracy and learn about public benefits. They also serve as a contact point for bureaucrats on matters of community development, and advocate for their neighborhood by providing up-to-date information to municipal decision-makers with less detailed knowledge. Particularly in areas where the state is distant, local leaders serve as reputable grassroots links. Without this link, the state would lack both critical information on community needs and a method of communicating with residents.

Local leaders also act as brokers by connecting politicians to voters. Politicians contract with brokers because they lack direct linkages, credibility and knowledge. Brokers in return provide a variety of services including mobilization, facilitating access, and responding to voter demands (Zarazaga, 2014; Nichter and Peress, 2017; Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Szwarcberg, 2015; Auyero, 2000). In Colombia, neighborhood leaders negotiate arrangements with politicians based on the number of voters they can bring to the polls and the incentives politicians are willing to offer in return. Through their brokerage work, local leaders connect weak political parties to voters.

The behavior of local leaders who multitask as grassroots governors and political brokers can appear conflicting when researchers look at these tasks in isolation. In the following section I present a descriptive and holistic look at the main institutional actors in my dissertation and provide a clearer picture of the motivators of their behavior. When possible, I show the responsibilities facing these grassroots actors in the words of communal action board presidents themselves.

Local Leaders Increase State Legibility

In many areas of low state capacity, governments formally or informally subcontract out the role of the state in collecting and disseminating information to intermediary neighborhood-level leaders. Grassroots organizations led by these leaders are common in democracies where they take the form of Katchi Basti Vikas Samitiyaan in India, Sanguniang Barangays in the Philippines, Rukun Wargas in Indonesia, Citizens Advisory Councils in Iraq, Shuras in rural Afghanistan, or Juntas de Acción Comunal in Colombia. When these types of community councils work well, they can play a pivotal role in communicating community concerns to higher levels of government, creating buy-in and spreading trusted information about public benefit programs among populations skeptical of the formal state, and gathering and transmitting demographic information that can be used in development efforts. Local leaders filter complex grassroots knowledge for the state and interpret the state for neighborhood residents. Because of these abilities, local neighborhood associations are a cost effective way to increase state legibility in

low state capacity areas.

States have a desire to create a *legible* social order by codifying and systematizing, even when these standardization schemes stand in contrast to local practice (Scott, 1998). Low state capacity is a product of low legibility - when states have little information about citizens and their activities, they are unable to enforce rules and overcome collective action problems like free-riding (Lee and Zhang, 2017). Specifically, Lee and Zhang (2017) find that sub-national areas with less errors in census data, their proxy for state legibility, have better tax collection capacity and provide greater public goods. Consequently, collecting accurate demographic data in areas where it is absent is usually a high-level state priority.

Communal action board leaders extend the state by collecting these kinds of demographic data and even physically link citizens by bringing residents to municipal offices. In doing so, they play a central role in translating the state and political society to diverse local contexts. One leader I spoke with described themselves as the "eyes, and ears in the community" and "agents of information" identifying the most pressing needs for local officials, but also acting as "spokespersons for the benefits that the mayor's office, the government, or the Ministry of the Interior are giving."[3] They respond to formal requests for information through surveys and consultations for the city's development plans, but also act as informal inter-

[3]Interview 7269 - Spring 2020

locutors by connecting residents in need to friends in city government and calling government bureaucrats personally.

The information balance between the state and social leaders is asymmetric. As one leader noted, "we really know who is who in this community, we know who deserves attention, and we know who is faking it to achieve a goal. We know, while the administration does not."[4] Particularly in areas where housing is informal and people lack land titles, communal action board leaders play a key role in vouching for claimants in land disputes or in deciding eligibility for place-based social welfare programs. One leader called himself, "the overseer of social welfare."[5]

Local leaders in Colombia are active members of civil society and not just block-level bureaucrats. They can and do utilize protests to pressure local authorities or private corporations to address community grievances. As one leader described it, they "remind authorities that communities sometimes react through civil disobedience" and straddle the line between instigating protest movements and calming them.[6] They also sometimes completely substitute for the state when the state is not working for them. Multiple leaders described building their own vigilante force as their response to security challenges and mistrust of the police.

[4]Interview 7064 - Spring 2020
[5]Interview 5851
[6]Interview 7269 - Spring 2020

I asked CAB presidents in Colombia to describe what people in their neighborhood usually ask them for help with. Responses to this question demonstrate the expansive roles of social leaders in local communities, both in connecting people to state services, making claims, and providing self-governance through community resources. The table below displays the type of help they mentioned.

Table 1.1: What do Social Leaders Do?

- Elderly benefits
- Property Legalization
- Contesting welfare strata ratings
- Electric grid repairs
- Donations for neighbors in need
- Signing up for welfare services
- Proving neighborhood residency
- Crime and Security
- Access to water
- COVID-19 food distribution
- Flattening dirt roads
- Paving roads
- Raising funds for public projects
- Christmas Parties
- Neighborhood clean ups
- Building a soccer field
- Building a park
- Medical Appointments
- Utility reconnections
- Church expansion
- Funeral costs and coffins
- Interpersonal conflicts
- Debt refinancing
- De-worming programs
- Responding to natural disasters
- Child care
- Pest control
- Youth programming
- Street lighting
- Security camera installation
- School improvement
- Drainage and Sewage
- Conflict Victim Status
- Land Disputes

Not all grassroots leaders exert the same level of effort in substituting for the state and immense variation exists in the extent to which leaders focus their energy on the more financially lucrative political work. The overlap between these two tasks results in biases in terms of the distribution of aid and assistance to people who

need it.

Clientelism and Local Leaders

Leaders of local organizations are often co-opted into clientelist brokerage positions where they leverage their community knowledge and influence to gather votes for political parties in exchange for positions of greater prestige or stability in the municipal government, rents from local development projects, or simply better public services for their communities (Novaes, 2018; Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Baldwin, 2013; Koter, 2013). The potential to bring many voters to the polls makes politicians more interested in forming relationships with local leaders that have larger followings, giving bigger groups better rewards (Szwarcberg, 2012).

Clientelism is relatively commonplace in Colombia (Fergusson et al., 2017) and tiered networks that include co-opting social leaders as brokers are the dominant way of buying votes (Palencia, 2013; Jimeno, 2018). For example, in observations of a communal action board meeting, the area president implored residents to re-register at a new polling place located in their neighborhood and attend rallies in support of the incumbent mayor in order to receive a new community water tank through a municipal small works grant. CAB presidents working as political brokers sell neighborhood votes wholesale to candidates during election season in exchange for public incentives to be shared with the community and/or private incentives that the broker can pocket. Of the vote-buying expenditure, one source

suggests that brokers can take a 20-30% cut (Caro, 2019).

Coordinating turnout is a massive component of CAB leaders' election-period activities. Politicians outsource the work of bringing people to the polls to communal presidents by allocating methods of transportation to brokers, often in the forms of vans and motorcycle taxis. Motorcycles tend to work better than vans, which means that the neighborhood presidents engage in a serious logistic enterprise balancing one-by-one transport with impatient voters. Politicians have to rely on neighborhood presidents, acting as brokers, to coordinate these turnout efforts because the logistics require detailed, on-the-ground, community knowledge and an intuition about how residents plan to vote such that more certain supporters get transportation preference. Traffic is usually heavy on election day, particularly near polling places, and many people live too far away to reasonably walk, so without this transportation, many neighborhood residents likely would not turn out to vote.

Communal action board presidents in Colombia are sometimes dealt a bad hand for turning out voters. Heavy rain from the hurricane season that coincides with elections every October can wash out roads, making certain neighborhoods impassable. Some neighborhoods are dominated by immigrants from Venezuela who entered the country on provisional visas or are undocumented, meaning they can-

not vote in even territorial elections unlike other permanent resident non-citizens.[7] Colombia has one of the highest rates of internal displacement in the world, and many residents in their neighborhood could prefer to vote in the municipality from which they migrated. Luis, a communal action board president, coordinates motorcycle transportation for the many residents of his neighborhood who had been displaced from their homes in rural areas of the municipality but refuse to change their voter registration, which means many of his motorcycles are used sending people to vote over an hour away. While brokers in the literature seem to be able to choose where they work and who they can mobilize, the "community leader" brokers that are common in many parts of the world are geographically constrained and have to deal with unhelpful geographic conditions if they want access to politically-motivated redistribution.

I spoke with communal action board presidents about whether they engage in voter mobilization and responses were divided between those who do not engage in voter mobilization at all, those who do mobilize voters but described themselves as guiding and suggesting candidates in implicit terms, and others who made their political efforts explicit. Some leaders interviewed denied participating in any form of voter mobilization, and were clear in their commitment to not use their leadership positions to engage in electoral politics. Some referenced democratic

[7] I conducted resident interviews in a few peripheral neighborhoods in Santa Marta where my research assistant and I spent three to four hours looking for Colombian citizens only to be told that these neighborhoods were *"puro Venezolano"* which did not square with board membership rosters claiming that the area had hundreds of Colombian residents.

principles in explaining why they stayed away from politics, claiming that "people should make voting decisions on their own"[8] and that "politicians, when they get elected, have to give things to the neighborhood or the *pueblo*, irregardless of whether one is giving them votes there."[9] Others felt strong animosity towards politics. One leader went so far as to call himself "a-political" because he was "against the bad government that Santa Marta has"[10] and another summarized his reasoning as "communal means communal"[11]

Other respondents framed their work in purely electoral terms that fit neatly into the definition of brokerage, and were proud of their political engagement. One leader told our team that he has "854 votes" and he mobilizes them to support a particular political party that he has worked with for the last 9 years.[12]. Multiple leaders claimed they have to "force them (residents), if not tell them what the best option is"[13] because "there is some impact or a political agreement of support in exchange for something of interest to the community."[14] Other respondents framed their work squarely in pro-social terms. They felt that alliances with political candidates were a key opportunity for local leaders to make their communities better, and that informing residents of the best politician for their neighborhood was an important responsibility. One leader described their role as a "guide" or a "light

[8]Interview 9641
[9]Interview 8065
[10]Interview 5211
[11]Interview 8235
[12]interview 74
[13]Interview 6796
[14]8899

for that."[15] Most leaders framed their decision to work with political candidates as generating strategic relationships and improving neighborhood services.

Multiple respondents claimed that vote-buying, where people were paid cash to vote for certain candidates, was an unsavory practice that they did not participate in and drew clear normative lines between paying cash for votes and mobilizing in support of neighborhood projects, which respondents viewed much more positively. One leader described their reluctance but dependence on mobilizing voters by saying:

> "Well I am very respectful.... It's obvious that one has to do politics because one should have strategic allies to assist with the work of them, the politicians, in order to bring good action to the neighborhood. In other words, for the sake of creating a good reputation in the community, not selling the vote, not saying: 'Give me the vote so I can give myself a stipend', I don't respect that. The community is simply motivated to say: 'This person seems ideal to represent us', and that with that seat we will have a friend, a strategic ally for the solution of our problems in the community, which these days I am reflecting on with this COVID situation, right?"[16]

Political brokerage is inseparable from local leadership in many communities in

[15]Interview 8382
[16]Interview 368

Colombia, and leaders point to brokerage work as the best opportunity to extract public goods from an often unresponsive state, but their nuanced opinions on the topic raise an important question in my dissertation: when is it appropriate to call community leaders brokers? In the dissertation I use the most expansive definition of broker within the political science literature on this topic - a person who connects potential supporters with candidates for public office. This definition leaves out quid pro quo exchanges of votes for benefits, which is an essential component of *Clientelistic* brokers. The distinction on whether something of value was exchanged is key to understanding normative questions surrounding the role of brokers in democratic politics. Connecting voters with candidates they may wish to support facilitates information needed for democracy to function smoothly. Particularly in Colombia, where elections for national Senate seats feature over 1,000 registered candidates, brokerage services promote democracy by providing overwhelmed voters with information about those running.

When physical or monetary benefits are exchanged for votes, the transaction crosses into a normative grey area for me. Many "brokers" I spoke with described how their community deliberated together to decide how they would vote and what they wanted in return as a community. For poor neighborhoods, this form of agency is more impactful than distant policy proclamations. Given that perceptions of corruption are incredibly high in Colombia, ensuring that politicians respond to neighborhood needs in order to win elections is a reasonable response

to an imperfect democracy. Perpetuating a system where those with connections, or those who live in neighborhoods that lend themselves well to brokerage are the only ones who receive benefits, however, is clearly undesirable. As is one where clean candidates lack the chance to create more just or equitable systems because striking transactional deals is a prerequisite for power.

Issues over the equitable distribution of resources are systemic, rather than challenges that individuals alone can solve. With that in mind, I have tried to avoid assessments of whether the people featured in my dissertation are "democratic" or "good people." Some leaders are clearly ineffective at generating resources from outside their communities, in part because of their own strong moral stances against striking political bargains around elections. Residents that I interviewed at the beginning of my field work sometimes claimed that their neighborhood leader was inequitable in the way they distributed resources, and made unsubstantiated claims that leaders were pocketing resources from politicians or coporations - something that I could not verify or deny. Rather than adjudicating CAB leader behavior, I urge readers to see local leaders as making individual decisions that respond to a challenging environment characterized by differing constraints and opportunities.

1.1 Data in the Dissertation

Data and insights in this dissertation came from close to a year and a half of field work in two cities in Colombia: Bogotá and Santa Marta. Communal Ac-

tion Boards were not my original research topic when I started my field work in Colombia, but it soon became apparent that CABs are crucial to the way that people in peripheral communities navigate and interpret the state and politics. Not featured in this dissertation are countless conversations with residents surrounding the urban core of Santa Marta, exploratory interviews with particularly active community leaders, car rides with bureaucrats, visits to the city planning office, and long afternoon chats with the man responsible for interlocuting with all of Santa Marta's communal action boards. Only after a year of digesting this ethnographic-style data was I able to build internally valid surveys and structured interviews that form the basis of the chapters featured in my dissertation.

Data from chapter two comes from a survey and interviews with communal action board leaders within Santa Marta, the capital city of the Department of Magdalena, while data from chapter three come from other cities and villages in Magdalena. Chapter four is largely composed of publicly available data including GIS maps of Bogotá's communal action boards and block-level SES strata, Bogotá's communal action board membership status dataset, and table-level election results from the 2018 Senate race.

Table 1.2: Data Sources Featured

Santa Marta Communal Action Board Survey

This data was collected within the urban sector of Santa Marta, Colombia between March 2020 and July 2020. The survey instrument was originally designed to use face-to-face interviews and would have sampled from a complete list of neighborhoods in Santa Marta through home visits with communal leaders. We were able to sample 38 responses before the first case of COVID-19 was identified in Colombia and we had to switch to phone surveys. My research assistants and I attended training sessions for communal action board leaders on communal action board elections that were meant to be held in July, as well as public health trainings preparing for the arrival of COVID-19 and collected phone numbers for current CAB presidents, which we relied upon after the switch to phone surveys. Those phone numbers served as the starting point for snowball sampling to reach the remaining 64 leaders included in the phone survey.

The survey instrument features descriptive data about the leader and their neighborhood as well as long-form structured interview questions that were recorded using a voice recorder or notes depending on the respondent's preferences. The survey instrument for face-to-face interviews featured a conjoint experiment where respondents were handed tablets and asked to choose between two candidates of varying characteristics six different times. To facilitate questions over the phone, I switched to paired comparisons of two different characteristics.

Data from this survey is mostly used in Chapter 3, though some insights from the interview portion were used in other chapters.

Magdalena Communal Action Board Survey

This data was collected in other towns and villages in the Department of Magdalena outside Santa Marta, between November 2020 and April 2021. I procured a list of phone numbers for all registered communal action boards in Magdalena and received verbal permission from the community affiars office for the Governor of Magdalena to contact CAB leaders. After a slow start attempting to randomly select phone numbers off the list, we decided to select cities and villages in order of their expected cell phone coverage and focused on contacting all valid contact numbers within the municipal area. The municipalities include Aracataca, Cienega, Zona Bananera, El Banco, Plato, Fundación, Chivolo, and Algarrobo. In total we contacted 87 communal action board leaders.

The survey instrument features descriptive data about the leader and their neighborhood as well as long-form structured interview questions that were recorded using a voice recorder or notes depending on the respondent's preferences.

Data from this survey is mostly used in Chapter 2, though some insights from the interview portion were used in other chapters.

Spatial Data on CABs, Polling Places, and Economic Strata

This data is publicly available through the city of Bogotá's online spatial database found at `https://mapas.bogota.gov.co/`. This database includes three maps of Bogotá used in my dissertation: *Salones Comunales*, *Puestos de Votación*, and *Estratificación*. Communal meetings rooms (*Salones Comunales*) are spatial points that represent the "headquarters" for neighborhood communal action boards. Some meeting rooms are more formal neighborhood activity centers while others are individual leader addresses. I ensured that the communal meeting room addresses matched the contact details on each CAB in Bogotá available at `http://plataforma.participacionbogota.gov.co/` (registration required). The polling place spatial points data available online (*Puestos de Votación*) had been updated to reflect polling places for the 2019 local elections, but the results data I used was from the 2018 national elections. To rectify discrepancies, I checked each address by hand and updated polling place locations that appeared to have changed from 2018 to 2019. Finally, I used *Manzana* or city-block level data on social welfare strata for Bogotá. Social welfare strata ranges from 1-5, with 5 being the wealthiest areas of the country to 1 being the poorest.

Data from this survey is used in Chapter 4

My lead research assistant, Arianna De Luque, provided much needed local context and insight from Santa Marta. She helped structure the survey questions to make them interprettable to the research population, helped to design safe research protocols, and assisted in interpretting and analyzing the responses. Her participation in the research, from early conversations with community residents to managing the data collection process was integral to the final product. All errors are, of course, my own.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter 2: A Typology of Social Leader Accountability

In chapter two I create a typology of broker accountability that helps to explain conflicting claims on broker behavior in existing literature. Looking at social leaders as purely motivated by community preferences or as cogs in a political machine glosses over important motivations that determine how people in predominantly poor and middle-income neighborhoods experience politics and results in illfitting empirical findings. Instead, I map social leaders who act as brokers across four types - constrained, patronage-motivated, social-oriented, and autonomous - based on the level of accountability they face from communities and candidates for public office. I apply the framework to explore issues of effective social leadership - whether leaders have upward connections to the state through understanding formal bureaucratic channels or access to favor networks.

Chapter 3: Do Elections for Brokers Yield Better Candidates for Public Office?

Chapter three explores the impact of elections for social leaders on their engagement with politics. Previous work has suggested that elections for local brokers push brokers to generate community development. I build on this finding to explore the impact of social leader elections on local and national politics, specifically whether elections push social leaders into brokerage positions and downplay corruption in candidate profiles. I find that elections for social leaders encourages

them to participate in political mobilization and results in those who opt out of mobilizing serving only one term, but cannot definitely state whether the impact of elections is causal or instead a product of certain leader types selecting out of running again. I also use two discrete choice experiments to explore the impact of elections on broker choice in the kinds of candidates they engage with. I show that leaders who plan to run for reelection are slightly more likely to choose candidates who promise local neighborhood investments, even at the expense of electing a "clean" candidate compared to their retiring peers. The two results taken together caution against encouraging more formal election mechanisms for community leaders as elections may be perpetuating the involvement of communal leaders in contractual exchanges of votes for public goods.

Chapter 4: The Impact of Brokerage Density on Signalling Support at the Polls

Chapter four maps brokerage density (using communal action board meeting places as a proxy) at the polling place level to show that dense polling stations, previously believed to be less monitorable and therefore less active for clientelistic brokerage, see higher levels of indicators suggesting robust voter mobilization efforts. I show that dense polling places have more votes for "downlist" candidates in open-list proportional races and are more competitive overall than comparable polling stations with fewer brokers, controlling for the wealth of the vicinity surrounding the polling place and polling place size. Adding two additional brokers per polling place adds the equivalent of 1 additional candidate actively competing

at the polling place, and decreases the vote share of party leaders compared to lower-listed party candidates by 1%. This finding contributes to the literature in clientelistic brokerage by presenting a novel way of thinking about how brokers can signal their effort using polling place election returns and providing novel data on the distribution of political brokers through geographic space.

CHAPTER II

A Typology of Social Leader Accountability

2.1 Introduction

Considering community leaders as driven solely by social-advancement motives or purely patronage motives can cause us to miss subtle differences that explain variation in social leader behavior and performance. This chapter places community leaders on a two-dimensional accountability spectrum that considers the relationship between community leaders and both the community that appoints them, and the electorally motivated politicians who often fund their work. Accountability in these two directions is key to understanding the immense variation in the functioning of community organizations – ranging from effective social leaders who translate community needs into community improvement to leaders for community organizations that exist on paper only. Specifically, I demonstrate that variation in accountability produces different types of neighborhood leaders that map onto distinct experiences and show how this framework can help explain competing explanations about broker behavior from across the discipline. I also apply this framework to explore how two elements of effective social leadership – knowledge

of rules and regulations to request improvements (formal resource access) and political-bureaucratic influence to be able to receive favors from those in power (informal resource access) relate to the type of accountability that a neighborhood leader faces.

Scholarship that isolates just one of the principal-agent relationships that brokers face leaves us wit h too few tools to understand community leaders who don't always act like extensions of political machines. Party bosses are reliant on brokers to execute their voter mobilization work because of their superior local knowledge (though recent work by Brierley and Nathan (2019) question the true knowledge level of brokers), but this knowledge gap allows brokers to behave opportunistically by redirecting mobilization funds to expenditures that are more beneficial to the broker's local political plans rather than as the party boss intended (Camp, 2017; Novaes, 2018; Stokes et al., 2013; Szwarcberg, 2012, 2015). In response to this information asymmetry, party bosses favor working with brokers whose efforts can be monitored at the polling station level (Larreguy et al., 2016) and face trade-offs between employing brokers who are knowledgeable and brokers who are loyal (Camp, 2017; Brierley and Nathan, 2019). Recent literature in brokerage has also emphasized the socially beneficial effects of accountability between brokers and the communities they mobilize (Auerbach, 2016; Gottlieb, 2017; Nathan, 2019). This chapter contributes to these recent advances by explicitly considering variation in both dimensions of accountability simultaneously. With this added varia-

tion we can highlight differences between leaders who are constrained and leaders who are socially oriented to show how brokers who are seemingly accountable to communities might face difficulty generating cash for community investment from politicians, while brokers who are accountable to politicians might lack community relationships to make positive change in the neighborhood.

Community leaders are accountable to both the community that (s)elects leaders based on their ability to promote investment in community development, and electorally-minded politicians who fund the bulk of this work. Even within the same formal institutional structure, community leaders vary in how accountable they are to the communities they represent – ranging from robust competition in community leadership elections to uncontested or even outright fraudulent elections. Community leaders also vary in accountability to party bosses that contract with them based on factors like the characteristics of polling stations assigned to the neighborhood, the size of the neighborhood voting bloc, and whether leaders have external offers from other candidates. Variation across these two dimensions maps on to four different stylized types of community leaders and has implications for the ability of local leaders to extract resources from the state and political candidates.

Colombia's communal action boards (CABs) make an ideal case to understand the theoretical implications of accountability because they share the same for-

mal standards across the country but still show wide variation in community and politician accountability, as well as in their ability to generate community development. Created with the purpose of expanding state control into peripheral parts of the country, communal action boards are constitutionally mandated outlets for communities to express neighborhood-level needs to higher levels of government. Within the same city, CABs range from a form of collective self-governance to extensions of a political machine and the tenure of leaders is highly variable. The competitiveness of neighborhood CAB leadership elections varies, as does the ability of leaders to switch political camps or receive benefits from non-elected actors and therefore extract higher prices for their community's electoral support.

The preliminary data collection for this work occurred came from lowland and mountainous areas of the department of Magdalena and was informed by a year of field work in the capital city of Santa Marta. Santa Marta and the rest of Magdalena are an ideal study site because the location has two active political machines – the Mello/Cotes family that is allied with the powerful Char clan of Barranquilla and Carlos Caicedo's Fuerza Ciudadana that brought a new style of politics to the region (Valencia Agudelo, 2020). Mobilization efforts from the two machines generate options for local brokers. Furthermore, during Caicedo's tenure, the dominant form of voter mobilization transitioned from mostly cash payments to increasing promises of neighborhood-level investments, which shifted political power to local CAB leaders rather than city-wide campaign workers. Dur-

ing the data collection period, Magdalena experienced historic droughts, floods, the COVID-19 pandemic, an influx of refugees from Venezuela and national and local elections, all of which heightened the role of grassroots leadership in the city's daily political life.

I create a typology of community organizations varying on two dimensions of accountability – accountability to community and accountability to politicians or parties. Interviews with neighborhood residents, municipal bureaucrats, party operatives, and social leaders inform the typology. I place community organizations in the typology using a surveys and interviews with an original sample of 88 community leaders and explore the typology's empirical implications for both community-driven development and electoral politics.

Placing leaders along this typology reveals an unequal distribution across the types. Patronage-captured leaders, who are accountable to political parties or candidates but not to their own communities are a minority of the leaders I spoke with. Instead, the plurality of leaders (38) are social-oriented because they have alternative sources for resources besides elected officials but must face challengers to keep their leadership position. Twenty leaders face both sources of accountability, while 23 face neither. Leaders from each type largely vary on their level of bureaucratic knowledge, with some confidently navigating state and municipal bureaucracy and others feeling as if the state is inaccessible. Patronage-captured leaders had the

greatest access to favors from local officials, while autonomous leader were largely unable to request favors. Combined, these results show striking variation in the degree to which leaders could bring resources into their communities. While social-oriented local leaders who face elections may have more local legitimacy, they and more autonomous leaders often describe themselves as ineffective at bringing in resources from outside the community. Patronage-captured leaders tend to fare far better, despite lacking community-based accountability. These results raise further questions as to the role of elections, both for neighborhood leadership and for public office, in generating tangible improvements in poor neighborhoods.

While I build and test the theory with a formal institution that is constitutionally recognized by the state, this could extend to a wide variety of other community organizations so long as they a) exist indefinitely or outside of individual development projects, b) represent a community that has a sufficient level of electoral competition and c) operate in a context where it is appropriate for community organizations to engage in political mobilization. Some community-driven development initiatives for specific projects by-pass local leadership to avoid elite capture. In these short-term cases, local committees may not have enough exposure to be co-opted into brokerage networks or their tenure may not overlap with election season, which would limit the impact of politicians as principals. Social leaders who work within areas that lack real political competition may also lack relationships with politicians because candidates can easily win reelection without expenditures

on voter mobilization. While the theory in part seeks to explain when community organizations engage in politics, in some cultural contexts community organizations are exclusively apolitical. The theory put forth in this chapter requires some degree of permissiveness of community organization involvement in electoral politics. Many forms of communal organizations fit these criteria within and outside of Latin America ranging from local brokers in Senegal (Gottlieb, 2017) to slum captains in India (Auerbach, 2016).

This typology and empirical analysis contribute to the literature on communal organizations by fully theorizing the variation in political and social involvement of community leaders. Within comparative politics, community leaders have been depicted as appendages of political machines (Stokes et al., 2013; Szwarcberg, 2012), political mobilizers held captive by requests from residents (Nichter and Peress, 2017), altruistic community-driven negotiators (Baldwin, 2018; Auerbach, 2017), and caciques (Knight and Pansters, 2005). While these examples come from multiple case contexts, this work studies the theoretical conditions under which this variation can co-occur within the same administrative division (department, in this case). By placing altruistic community leaders and mobilizers for political machines on the same dimension, I highlight potential explanations for previously incompatible findings (for instance, Brokers in Argentina are thought to know vote choices, but data from Ghana suggests they do not). A typology featuring both political machines and socially oriented community leaders bridges the gap between

narrowly focused studies of vote-buying to much larger discussions of group-level political behavior.

The tension in this chapter between accountability and effectiveness contributes to long-standing normative questions in political science on finding the right balance between community-level control and effective leadership that inform practical questions surrounding the best local governance designs for community development projects. While advocates of increasing democratic accountability point to its constraining effect on leader behavior, the empirical puzzle remains – accountable and motivated leaders are not always able to generate improvements in neighborhoods. Instead, I join a growing field of social scientists studying the drawbacks to electoral-based accountability schemes by pointing to skills that leaders develop through tenure in office and their ability to leverage their position for greater access to resources.

Finally, the study joins recent work in generating publicly accessible data on neighborhood and community level governance in Latin America. Despite their role as interlocutors of state resources in local communities throughout the region, little work within the discipline has seriously considered the role of Communal Action Board leaders in Colombia outside of non-state insurgencies (Arjona, 2016; Vargas, 2019). As key access points to the state, gathering systematic data on the political and social leadership roles can shed a valuable descriptive light on quotidian

interaction with authority across much of Latin America.

2.2 Literature Review

Party bosses and political operatives face an information problem when contracting with local organization leaders to engage in voter mobilization, and this information problem affects the level of accountability between the two. Party bosses in many cases need local brokers to mobilize voters because they lack direct linkages with voters and believe -at times, incorrectly (Brierley and Nathan, 2019)- that local brokers have better information about voter propensity and greater persuasiveness among the community of target voters. When broker incentives do not align with those of political bosses, the information asymmetries allow brokers to both misrepresent the true size of their voting bloc and opportunistically distribute resources for mobilizing votes in ways that benefit the local broker's following rather than the party's (Stokes et al., 2013). Because broker shirking is very costly for politicians, they prefer to work with monitorable brokers, but brokers who can credibly threaten to switch camps generate the highest returns (Camp, 2017). The literature outlines three primary categories to evaluate the accountability between brokers and the politicians who contract with them: incentive alignment, monitoring of vote tallies, and the loyalty of voting blocs to brokers.

Party bosses can attempt to align the incentives of local brokers and the party such that monitoring broker behavior is unnecessary. Creating promotional incentives

by incorporating brokers into the political party can align incentives such that the party's success is shared by the broker (Szwarcberg, 2012). Community leaders as brokers sometimes desire cushier and more powerful positions as city councilors and so, with the promise of a spot on the next ballot, consider the electoral success of a party to be personally beneficial to them. Parties can also choose to work with brokers whose incentives naturally align with parties (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). Brokers representing organizations like labor unions in a two-party system may have the organizational capacity to switch their voting bloc to another candidate, but that threat lacks credibility if the other candidate's politics is unpalatable to the group. Particularly for agreements with brokers representing voter blocs that are not geographically concentrated, incentive alignment helps overcome information asymmetry.

Political operatives can also overcome information asymmetries by monitoring broker behavior using polling station vote tallies. When judging the impact of brokers on vote tallies, smaller polling stations provide a clearer picture of broker performance. Because polling station size is often known in advance of the election, political bosses target their resources towards brokers who will mobilize voters at smaller and therefore more monitorable polling stations (Larreguy et al., 2016; Rueda, 2017).[1] The ability for campaigns to monitor broker performance in theory reduces shirking, but it does not necessarily improve the potential for mobilization.

[1]The ability for brokers to signal effort at polling places is something I address in more detail in Chapter 3

Brokers with loyal voting blocs are less accountable to politicians who employ them because they can credibly threaten to switch political camps at any time (Camp, 2017). Because brokers with the most local influence often come with the greatest risk of defection, political operatives face a dilemma: they can choose to employ brokers who are highly accountable to them but are ineffective at mobilizing large groups of voters, or they can pay increasingly high costs for effective brokers who are disloyal (Camp, 2017; Novaes, 2018).

In addition to accountability to political operatives, brokers are also accountable to the community that (s)elects them. Even without formal elections for community leadership, leaders with a larger group selecting them are expected to promote greater provision of public goods, though there are some notable exceptions (Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015). Local leaders exert effort that generates greater community development when they are held accountable the community (Zarazaga, 2014; Auerbach, 2016; Gottlieb, 2017; Nichter and Peress, 2017; Nathan, 2019).

The accountability of local leaders to the community varies based on the selection process and the importance of local leadership in the area. Hereditary and otherwise non-competitive local leadership selection reduces accountability to the local community because leaders who lack competition can remain with the support of only a narrow part of the community and therefore the alignment of preferences

between voters and brokers is not credible (Gottlieb, 2017). In contrast, an increasing strand of literature has identified cases where traditional means of leadership selection improve accountability without formal elections (Baldwin and Holzinger, 2019; Baldwin, 2018; Murtazashvili, 2016; Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015; Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2014). Traditional means of selecting local leaders without a secret ballot in some cases can promote even greater accountability through frequent, deliberative, and collective decision-making rather than citizen involvement only once every few years (Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015; Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2014). In circumstances without regular competitive elections, local leaders can still be held accountable to the community through social sanctioning mechanisms (Tsai, 2007) and norms of deliberative decision-making. Similarly, when residents are not reliant on grassroots leadership to generate improvement in their area, they may lack motivation to sanction local leaders who do not perform.

Unaccountable leaders who are not subject to any form of social sanctioning by residents can still be prolific vote mobilizers through coercion. Negative inducements including removal from public employment, social exclusion, and even violence are common broker strategies and can be more effective than positive inducements at mobilizing voters (Mares and Young, 2016a). Gottlieb finds that brokers in Senegal who are more economically independent from voters are more likely to employ coercion as a strategy when they lack the credibility to use persuasion due to the absence of community accountability (2017). Coercion allows local leaders who

are unaccountable to the community to mobilize large numbers of voters without persuasion or local legitimacy.

Combining these two branches of the clientelism literature by examining broker accountability holistically can shed light on a contradiction that I encountered in my field work. Sometimes the most effective local leaders in generating resources for development projects were seemingly unmotivated by leadership elections because they were sure no one would run against them. At the same time, leaders facing highly contested elections lacked the cash and grants needed to invest in their communities.

This work also is informed by practical gaps in the community driven development literature. Development organizations increasingly partner with local community groups to promote community-driven development, but these partnerships often fall short of lofty expectations for economic development, social cohesion, and accountable governance (Levine, 2021; White et al., 2018). Scholars and practitioners in community development have found that poorly designed community participation schemes merely mimic pre-existing community power structures that exclude minority voices and suffer from elite capture (Bosancianu et al., 2019; Buntaine et al., 2018).

A narrow focus on community leaders as either socially oriented actors or sources

of elite corruption impacts the return on the World Bank's multibillion-dollar investment in community-driven development. Since the 1960's grassroots social leaders have been held aloft by the international and development-policy community as key partners in equitable development (Binswanger-Mkhize and de Regt, 2010). Community-driven development programs that work with local actors can fall short in achieving equitable results due to elite-capture where choices that are meant to be decided through community consensus are redirected by local leadership (White et al., 2018; Bosancianu et al., 2019; Buntaine et al., 2018). Designs that attempt to by-pass local leadership to avert elite capture instead can suffer from a lack of local relational capital and local organizational knowledge that local leaders often best provide (Madajewicz et al., 2017).

Designers of community-driven development plans attempt to work around elite capture by establishing standalone project-based committees rather than working with pre-existing community organizations. As a result, these efforts sideline leaders who can provide valuable local knowledge, lend trust in the community, and effectively sanction non-compliers(Madajewicz et al., 2017; Mansuri and Rao, 2012).[2] Less research thus far has explored the conditions under which we should expect elite capture to divert resources away from potential beneficiaries if they were chosen by the community in a deliberative process. This gap has important

[2]The city of Santa Marta often employs this tactic by asking communities to establish a committee of residents apart from the Communal Action Board president before they can receive grants from the city. Critics claim this policy is selectively employed in areas where the board president has connections with other political movements.

practical implications because by-passing elites out of fear of elite capture can harm these communal institutions in the long-term while losing the local expertise of social leaders in the short-term.

In what cases should we expect local leadership to reflect community interests, and when should we expect elite capture to remain an issue? By placing community organizations in the larger political context, we can better predict the size and direction of CDD discrepancy and minimize the tradeoff between elite influence and elite knowledge.

A Typology of Community Leader Accountability

Social leaders, formally or informally, need the backing of a portion of the community to maintain their leadership position, but often rely on politicians for the revenue needed for community-improvements. In some cases, leaders are elected to their positions through secret-ballots, while in other cases social leaders informally maintain influence over a group of people. In either case, if community members no longer think the leadership is doing a good job the community can, under conditions of accountability, replace leadership with someone they think may perform better.

I consider a social leader to be accountable to the community if some of the following conditions are met:

1. Community members are knowledgeable about the behavior of local social leaders
2. Community members can effectively remove social leaders from their position due to poor performance
3. Community members have multiple outside options to go to for leadership (for example, if the local religious leader is also mobilizing votes and generating self-governance)

Hosting activities and solving community problems are a large part of how community members evaluate community leader performance, but these activities require resources. Informally, community leaders receive much of their revenue for community development through mobilizing voters on behalf of politicians to create indebtedness between the politician and community. This capital can come through varied forms of political patronage – ranging from pork-barrel politics to voter mobilization budgets. When social leaders need this revenue and these relationships to comply with development demands from within the community, social leaders are often accountable to politicians as well.

I consider a social leader to be accountable to politicians if the following conditions are met:

1. Social leaders need resources from politicians (lack outside or programmatic resource options)

2. Voter mobilization efforts are highly monitorable in the aggregate at local polling stations and social leaders cannot credibly threaten to back other candidates (preference misalignment, disloyal or small voting bloc, core party neighborhood, etc)

3. OR Politicians have multiple outside options for brokerage (for example, a local religious leader)

We can demonstrate the varied levels of accountability with the typology below:

Table 2.1: Typology of Social Leader Accountability

	Accountability to Politicians (H)	Accountability to Politicians (L)
Accountability to Community (H)	Constrained	Social-oriented
Accountability to Community (L)	Patronage-captured	Autonomous

As accountability shifts from high (H) to low (L) across both axes, community leaders become more autonomous, but this autonomy could come at a cost. As accountability to politicians decreases, risk-averse political candidates skeptical of free-agents and unmonitorable brokers will be less willing to risk their mobilization resources, but brokers will be more able to credibly threaten to transfer their voting blocs. To compensate for increased risk, brokers can signal a large voting bloc through rally attendance and local meetings, but not all brokers have sufficient

community influence to accomplish this.

Along the opposite axis, community leaders are less reliant on promoting local development to keep their positions when accountability is low but can remain in their positions long-term which helps develop political relationships. Community leader accountability to both the community they serve and the politicians they mobilize voters for moderates their ability to develop local community knowledge through experience and the relationships needed to ask for a favor, which has key impacts on pro-development outcomes. Below I describe each of the "ideal type" social leaders and how accountability may constrain their behavior.

Grassroots community organizations are often meant to be **social-oriented** organizations – accountable to the community and working with politicians, but not accountable to them. Social-oriented community groups who are unhappy working with one politician can credibly threaten to transfer their voting-bloc to another candidate, or they may have alternative sources of revenue such that they do not need revenue from politicians at all. Community members in this high level community accountability environment can pressure social-oriented leadership to gain tangible development improvements and can replace leaders with poor performance, so leaders frequently face re-election challenges.

Grassroots organizations that are highly accountable to both politicians and the

community are **constrained** in their behavior. This position is difficult as the politician can withhold sources of funding to the community and community members can vote or otherwise remove the incumbent from their leadership position. Constrained social leaders are limited in generating community improvements for two reasons. They lack the ability to negotiate high rates in return for their mobilization work because political bosses can choose to work with other mobilizers or leaders cannot credibly threaten to switch political camps. Because they face competitive re-election prospects, leader turnover reduces the community and bureaucratic knowledge needed to ask for and receive the right assistance.

Patronage-captured grassroots organizations operate as extensions of a party or candidate political machine and allocate community revenue in ways that will help the politicians they work with. When the political machine has seats in local government, grassroots leaders have access to state resources for development, but lack these resources when the party loses elections. Patronage-captured grassroots leaders can move up the party ranks by earning a position on the party's ballot, so their leadership tenure can be short despite few opportunities for the community to vote them out. Much of the literature on brokerage assumes that brokers fall in this cell.

Autonomous local leaders face few constraints on their behavior but lack the accountability-induced incentives to improve public goods in the community. Au-

tonomous leaders can come in many forms, ranging from decentralized despots to leaders that exist on paper only. These autonomous social leaders hold their positions for long periods of time and build up immense local knowledge, while political bosses who want to secure votes in the locality have few alternatives to partnering with them.

Established literature in political science considers a wide range of different actors who could fall along this typology, but most works lack conceptual clarity on how the actors involved differ from those in other parts of the literature. Considering the many different types of brokers featured in prominent literature on clientelism results in contradictory findings from across contexts. For instance, in just Adam Auerbach's work in India, he looks at partisan broker networks that I categorize as patronage-captured, and slum development committee leaders who I might categorize as social-oriented. Both actors are brokers, and yet have remarkably different constraints and motivations. Similarly Szwarcberg's work in Argentina depicts brokers with enormous power to withhold access to welfare, whereas in Brazil Nichter and Peress find that brokers there feel they must fulfil every voter request or fear losing their position. While more work looks at variation in accountability in one direction (for instance, Gottlieb (2017 or Nathan (2019), exploring both sources of accountability simultaneously may result in different findings.

In the following table, I place 30 prominent works in the clientelism literature on

the typology of social leader accountability. In many cases, authors do not provide enough detail in order to assess whether brokers in their study actually face any degree of accountability, but the theoretical insights and assumptions in each piece make it possible to assign my interpretation of the author's conception of leader type. I also include works that explicitly consider variation in broker type across just one accountability spectrum (community or political accountability), but in most of these cases it's impossible to know whether the actors in the study faced additional sources of accountability.

Table 2.2: Constrained Leaders in Prominent Literature

- (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015)
- (Nichter and Peress, 2017)
- (Szwarcberg, 2012)

Table 2.3: Social-Oriented Leaders in Prominent Literature

- (Auerbach, 2017)
- (Baldwin and Holzinger, 2019)
- (Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015)
- (Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2014)
- (Gottlieb, 2017)
- (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015)
- (Murtazashvili, 2016)
- (Nathan, 2019)
- (Novaes, 2018)

Table 2.4: Autonomous Leaders in Prominent Literature

- (Baldwin, 2013)
- (Baldwin, 2018)
- (Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015)
- (Bowles et al., 2020)
- (Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2014)
- (Gottlieb, 2017)
- (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015)
- (Koter, 2013)
- (Murtazashvili, 2016)
- (Nathan, 2019)
- (Novaes, 2018)

Table 2.5: Patronage-Captured Leaders in Prominent Literature

- (Auerbach, 2016)
- (Auyero, 2000)
- (Bowles et al., 2020)
- (Brierley and Nathan, 2019)
- (Brusco et al., 2004)
- (Calvo and Murillo, 2013)
- (Camp, 2017)
- (Camp et al., 2014)
- (Díaz-Cayeros et al., 2014)
- (Kramon, 2016)
- (Larreguy et al., 2016)
- (Lawson and Greene, 2014)
- (Oliveros, 2016)
- (Stokes, 2005)
- (Stokes et al., 2013)
- (Szwarcberg, 2012)
- (Szwarcberg, 2015)
- (Zarazaga, 2014)

2.3 Research Design

Data in this chapter comes from multiple sources gathered over the course of a year in the field and through phone surveys. The primary source of data comes from an original survey fielded in the Fall of 2020 with modules aimed specifically at placing social leaders on the accountability axes and measuring their level of formal and informal access points for resources: bureaucratic knowledge and ability to request favors. The results are supported by insights gleaned from 128 neighborhood leader interviews in the city of Santa Marta (March – May 2020), participant observation in the local affairs office in the city of Santa Marta (Spring

2019), and semi-structured interviews with neighborhood residents in select peripheral parts of the capitol (Fall and Spring 2019).

Divining the true level of accountability that social leaders face, particularly in relation with each other, is difficult through remote phone surveys. To best approximate these forces, I design two accountability indexes and use them to place social leader respondents on the X and Y accountability axes described in the typology. Questions were chosen to be non-sensitive and relatable to local leaders based on participant observation and qualitative research throughout 2019. To protect privacy and prevent legal concerns, I avoid asking questions that explicitly tie a respondent's role as a local CAB leader to partisan political involvement through vote buying, though personal involvement in campaigns apart from their professional leadership capacity is considered legitimate (Field Notes, March 2020). Each item in the index is expected to have face and content validity, sufficient variance to be informative and measure different manifestations of the same underlying concept, though all questions suffer somewhat from social desirability bias. I was unable to "fact-check" claims made by leaders during these interviews, so all data should be interpreted as representing the respondents' views of their own behavior, successes, and challenges.

While I theoretically describe community accountability as being more expansive than just elections, in practice I was unable to collect valid and informative details

about non-electoral accountability for local CAB leaders. Instead, I rely entirely on three survey questions judging competitive selection and competitive reelection. I assign accountability scores of 0, 1, and 2 based on an additive index including the following points:

1. In the previous election, did people run against you? (+1 if yes)
2. Are you running for reelection? If so, is someone running against you? (+1 if yes)

Similarly, I constructed an imperfect political accountability index mapping onto theoretical components, including whether the CAB needs resources from politicians and local government or maintains an outside option and their belief on whether politicians can tell how people in their community voted. Similar to community accountability, I was unable to capture the concept holistically with the survey and interviews conducted given social-desirability bias and the difficulty in judging whether leaders in fact required resources from political candidates and local officials. Instead, I assign political accountability scores of 0,1, and 2 based on the following information:

1. Did the respondent mention their ability to secure resources from local companies?[3] If so, they receive a score of 0 for political accountability.

[3]These local companies mainly include Drummond, an American mining corporation, and FENOCO, the railroad that carries the products of the mine to the port in Ciénega. The railways cuts through the middle of Magdalena, and any JAC whose territory touches the railway line is eligible to receive in-kind grants from the corporation as part of their state-mandated corporate social responsibility program. Pollution from the coal has negatively affected health outcomes

2. If they did not mention receiving resources from companies, and emphasized that they turn to politicians or the local government for securing funding (rather than self-generating funds), they receive a score of 1

3. If 2 is true, and they believed that it was probably, or very probable that politicians could tell how people in their community voted, they receive a score of 2

4. If 1 and 2 are false, they receive a score of 0.

Respondents for the survey were sampled from a comprehensive list of CAB leaders in 25 municipalities (excluding the municipality of Pueblo Viejo where no cell phone numbers were listed) in the department of Magdalena. Because the list of leaders is near complete, the research team was able to randomly sample leaders to be included in the survey. Each selected leader was contacted up to two times to reduce non-response bias. Due to variation in cell phone coverage, non-response bias is likely not "as-if random" because local conditions make phone calls more difficult in more remote areas.

At the time of survey, Colombia had just finished six months of an intense stay-at-home order that dramatically impacted the economy, particularly in the informal labor market. Data for another study featured in the dissertation was collected both before and after the stay at home order was placed, and results did not change

and infrastructure quality in the area.

significantly despite the stress of a global pandemic. The pandemic, however, is expected to change at least some of the behavior of local leaders. During the stay at home order, community meetings might not have been held that otherwise would have taken place, and I expect that CAB leadership was contacted with questions and requests from community members at a higher rate than normal due to the abnormal circumstances. In this period of time, the demands for services from CAB leadership are assumed to be high. The elections for CAB leadership were scheduled to take place in May, but have been postponed indefinitely, so some questions about whether they know if another person planned to run against them are much less tentative than they otherwise would have been at this point. Most other questions asked in the survey, however, are expected to be unaffected by the pandemic.

2.4 Placing Social Leaders Across Typology

Placing survey respondents[4] along the typology reveals that the least common form of social leader within this population is the patronage-captured type, while the most common form of social leader is social-oriented. The rarity of patronage-captured types underlines the importance of moving away from party machine archetypes as the basis for theoretical work. Instead, the bulk of respondents are constrained, social-oriented, or autonomous.

[4]Some respondents completed the survey but did not complete the interview or did not have their interviews recorded properly.

Table 2.6: Typology of Social Leader Accountability

	Accountability to Politicians (1-2)	Accountability to Politicians (0)
Accountability to Community (1-2)	Constrained (20)[5]	Social-oriented (38)[6]
Accountability to Community (0)	Patronage-captured (6)[7]	Autonomous (23)[8]

Patronage-captured leaders were a minority, but felt their political connections were valuable resources, despite sometimes being a liability. Patronage-captured leaders viewed working with political parties and candidates for office as a necessity. A leader used the saying "he who has power is he who commands... we should act politically because one receives benefits for the community when one knows how to work with them."[9] One leader describes how his connection with the political party not only gave him access and resources, but also provided him training in community organizing. He points out that many of the other leaders in the municipality had gotten positions as CAB presidents because they had secured a number of votes for the incumbent mayor, but "90% don't know basically what a communal board even is and what benefits we have access to through the board and through the government. So they're there because they're friends [with the

[5]Interviews: 1323, 2641, 5297, 5661, 5970, 6071, 7365, 752, 2871, 3301, 4008, 4228, 5889, 6687, 686, 7031, 81, 655, 6849, 9721

[6]Interviews: 1056, 14, 1959, 2003, 213, 2282, 2442, 2500, 3252, 3493, 3503, 3719, 3873, 4305, 4533, 5626, 6956, 7155, 7322, 7907, 8063, 8093, 8179, 8320, 859, 861, 8861, 9128, 9465, 9671, 9959, 1600, 3181, 3519, 3733, 3811, 648, 8622

[7]Interviews: 2186, 5451, 1112, 2188, 5726, 6009

[8]Interviews: 1212, 1354, 1830, 1935, 2328, 2476, 3150, 3262, 3444, 3518, 3672, 3798, 3817, 402, 4390, 4405, 5248, 5829, 687, 7259, 8158, 8627, 8701

[9]Interview 6009

mayor]."[10] Through the training this leader had received from a nation-wide political party, he was able to utilize formal channels to contest the neighborhood's social welfare subsidy (SISBEN) status with bureaucrats in Bogotá. His political work with the party, though, left him isolated from the receiving preferential treatment from the mayor's office, controlled by a different party. Instead, his work was mostly generated through a strong knowledge of bureaucratic channels and access to intangible party resources and networks. Another patronage-captured leader described his relationship with the mayor's office as "if the [CAB] president is not with the mayor, then forget it, you can't fight here, because they are not going to give you any type of royalty, they won't give you anything."[11] While working with campaigns can give you access to resources, backing the losing candidate is a risky proposition for many leaders.

Constrained leaders describe a strained relationship between themselves and political candidates while downplaying the importance of JAC elections. Working with political candidates "has not been a good experience" for one leader because candidates "come to the neighborhood looking to meet during campaigns, and afterwards they don't come back and they forget our needs."[12] They cite this experience as why they are undecided about running again in the upcoming election, despite winning a competitive election previously. Candidates use constrained leaders for votes and for visibility in the community, but some CAB

[10]Interview 2186
[11]Interview 5451
[12]Interview 655, similar sentiment expressed in Interviews 5297 and 752 and others

leaders are left uncomfortable with the sometimes un-democratic interplay between electoral politics and their community work, even when it means strengthening the community's network of supporters and additional resources for neighborhood development.[13] Even a local leader who had previously ran for city council himself thought "communal life should be apart from political life."[14]

Leaders in this constrained category also face risks from working with candidates that lose, and can become isolated when power shifts in mayoral elections.[15] Working with political candidates can sometime even hurt a leaders local credibility – one leader describes how a candidate who broke their promise once in office has caused the community to lose faith in them as a CAB leader, despite being well-informed on local politics and receiving some help from the mayor's office.[16] Despite all leaders in this category facing competitive elections or being selected through competitive elections, very few thought elections were important in determining the quality of CAB leadership, because "plenty of leaders were elected but end up not producing any results."[17]

Autonomous Leaders can be split into two groups – those that operate autonomously by finding other external resources and ways to extract what is needed from the state, and those that are isolated from external resources entirely and

[13]Interview 9721
[14]Interview 4228
[15]Interview 6687, Interview 7365
[16]Interview 81
[17]Interview 24

left to solve problems within the community, if at all. Both groups largely agreed that promises from politicians can't be trusted, but some had alternative places to go for assistance, ranging from FENOCO and Drummond[18] to the army garrison to well-connected neighbors. In these cases, some leaders had arrangements with local city councilors, or other political candidates but treated these as additional resources that were smaller in value or less reliable.[19] Two leaders opted out of political engagement because it wasn't worth the effort or the conditions in their neighborhood made political engagement difficult. One leader commented, "actually I intended to look for those kind of [political] benefits, but I saw that we weren't getting anything real because you know politicians, they offer help but then once they are in their positions they become different people. I scrutinized the issue and saw that it's better to look for things through the law and process... That's been our lived experience around here."[20] Whereas in another community, the mayor is of a different political group from the governor, and so the CAB president attempted to play both sides, which created what he described as "a contradiction."[21] All of these leaders were able to describe numerous public works and areas of success, many involving extensive bureaucratic knowledge.

[18]FENOCO (Ferrocarriles del Norte de Colombia S.A.) is the railroad company that transports coal across the Magdalena from the Drummund mine in Cesar Department to the Drummond port in Ciénega, Magdalena. Both FENOCO and Drummond are required to provide community assistance due to the coal dust pollution, noise, and property damage incurred while transporting coal. The train has a long history in Magdalena: `https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5EwFZVnv9p4`

[19]Interview 7259, 4405 and 8627

[20]Interview 3444

[21]Interview 3150

Other **autonomous** leaders lament the inaccessibility of local politicians, either because of distance or lack of social connections, and a lack of interest among their communities. One leader commented that "at one point, we had a city council member and people could tell him 'Look our neighborhood lacks this and that' and so people at least had somebody to tell things to, right? But now, he didn't stay a councilor, so we are, practically, incommunicado"[22] Another blamed their communities lack of familial ties: "We don't have a political family in the neighborhood or anything like that, so, we are really removed from the civilized world, you could say... The mayor's office has never given us the space (to contact them)..."[23] One leader called her community "disunited" and "apathetic" but was still able to create a number of public works using her own efforts to petition the government, including establishing a community meeting room, bringing public gas to the neighborhood, and a small park.[24]

Social-oriented leaders emphasized first their communities ability to solve problems on their own before asking for assistance from outside of the community, claiming that "if we work together, we can accomplish a lot."[25] For example, one leader noted that "the community always works together when there are problems in the neighborhood that affect all of us... between the leaders in the area and the community, we can solve most local problems."[26] Social-oriented leaders

[22]Interview 5829
[23]Interview 3518
[24]Interview 3262 (Interview 5248 expressed a similar sentiment with less grand results)
[25]Interview 8622
[26]Interview 1600

often worked with local government or politicians by "knocking on the doors of the administration,'[27] working "hand-in-hand" with the mayor[28] and petitioning government bureaucracy collectively. When striking deals with candidates, one leader emphasized that they "tried to get them to give us the things before, not after elections" since they had worked with candidates who did not comply with the bargain in the past.[29] Another leader framed his relationship with a political candidate for city council as one that the candidate lost out on by not supporting him enough in his campaign to be CAB president.[30] Even if leaders did not contribute votes to a political campaign, according to one leader, the community can still receive things "so long as you know how to ask."[31]

However, **Social-oriented** leaders aren't always successful in generating resources from local government. For example, one leader in a medium-sized municipality describes how he missed out on opportunities because he was neutral in the previous election:

> "With the previous mayor, I wasn't an enemy of him but also not a friend. And the result is that he had other people in mind when sharing food baskets... in the previous administration... there was some amount of money – 20 million pesos (5,500 USD), that the mayor gave to presidents that had an affinity for the mayor, or had some

[27]Interview 8622
[28]Interview 9671
[29]Interview 3181
[30]Interview 648
[31]Interview 9128

> connection with him, and provide votes and what not. To these people they gave 20 million pesos that the board could use to provide a public work in the neighborhood that they needed... How many times did I ask for pavement here in the neighborhood? The neighbors were going to help out with it too, and they [the mayor] never gave me the funds. There were many presidents of other boards that did receive that money and they could work with that cash. Meanwhile I couldn't do anything because I didn't have support.... I've always been apart, doing things because I want to help the neighborhood, not to be part of politics. Because, thank god, I have never had an aspiration to those political posts or anything like that"[32]

Divisions among members of CABs with **social-oriented** leaders pose an additional threat: "Even though I won because this same community chose me, when one wants to do an activity, the committee is very divided... we have to become united so that the mayor's office will give us some support."[33] Multiple leaders described their role as "uniting people"[34] as the prime job of the CAB president often through a form of deliberation that was largely unique to social-oriented communal action boards.[35] They utilized public meetings and committees to analyze problems and brainstorm solutions, and members of the committee would reach

[32]Interview 9599
[33]Interview 8861
[34]Interview 859
[35]Interview 8093

out to the local authorities if needed rather than just the CAB leader alone, a tactic that reduces the travel costs and burden other CAB presidents bemoaned.[36]

Within the same formal institution in Colombia, social leaders employed different tactics had different ways of accessing resources and were influenced by different sources of constraints and motivations. Viewing social leaders as homogenous skims over important variation in determining how they interact with the political world and generate development in their communities. The variation shown within just one institution in one administrative unit underscores the importance for any future work to fully consider where the study population fits along this typology. In the next section, I demonstrate the use of this typology in empirical work by exploring the relationship between leader type and effectiveness in generating resources for local development.

2.5 Application of Typology: Are Some Leaders More Effective at Getting Resources for their Communities than Others?

Each category of leader utilized different approaches for generating local development and helping their neighbors, but how do these different approaches affect performance?

[36]Interview 3811

Social leaders interviewed for this study range from incredibly effective to exasperated and worn down. Multiple leaders described themselves as "isolated" and "abandoned." One leader described their[37] situation approaching local leadership for resources as "One knocks on doors, and when one knocks not a single person answers."[38] On the other hand, some leaders were effective and accomplished, and brimming with pride over their community work. In just one neighborhood, a CAB leader explained that they had achieved improvements to the public health center, a public lighting project, road improvements, as well as access to subsidies for the youth and elderly.[39] Overall, I assessed that around 18 leaders were highly effective at attracting resources for their communities, 25 were limited in effectiveness, and another 23 were difficult to place on this scale because the interviews lacked sufficient detail or the accomplishments were too narrow to consider highly effective. The variation across communities underscores a foundational question: why are some leaders effective and others not?

To explore this question in light of my theoretical expectations, I demonstrate the importance of considering both sources of accountability together by looking at the explanatory power of community accountability and political accountability separately. I then delve into additional points of variation in terms of length of

[37]I purposely did not collect gender. My RAs on the ground thought it would be offensive to ask people their gender over the phone and I did not want RAs to write down their guesses as to the gender of the respondent. Instead, I refer to leaders as "they/them/their" throughout the paper, unless the respondent used a gendered pronoun to refer to themselves in the interview (for instance, *soy amiga* uses a feminine noun while *soy amigo* uses a masculine noun)

[38]Interview 648

[39]Interview 4533

tenure, formal access to resources through bureaucratic knowledge, and informal access to resources through the ability to request favors.

Variation along both axes affects neighborhood community leader performance through two modes of accessing resources from outside the community – formal access through bureaucratic knowledge, and informal access through relationships of indebtedness or friendship that allow leaders to request favors from those in positions of power. Bureaucratic knowledge is important for social leaders in understanding the process by which improvements can be requested and fulfilled. A social leader with high bureaucratic knowledge would not only know that a water pump is broken but would know what municipal office can help fix it, and how to fill out the paperwork effectively. The ability for a social leader to call in a favor is important for social leaders to affect change using resources from municipal or political funds. Politically appointed public workers can address community issues by raising them in priority and local politicians can use private campaign funds to address issues or contribute to community budgets. To solve community problems that require outside resources, a social leader likely needs a combination of both formal and informal access points to resources. I assume that all social leaders have sufficient knowledge on community concerns to identify necessary improvements.

While the typology is widely applicable, the analysis and expectations here are gen-

erated from the Colombian context where I found that many problems could indeed be solved through formal bureaucratic routes if one was persistent enough. Informal access to resources through favors from political campaigns is a major mode by which poor communities get resources they need, particularly in a timely manner. At the same time, some critical neighborhood needs like electric transformers, gas connections, victims registration, and more could be obtained through formal, albeit complicated and time-consuming, bureaucratic means. Even in places where formal access channels are largely ineffective, the original typology should still shed light on motivations of community leaders but I don't expect this application of the typology to be applicable.

The table below summarizes expectations on the components of social leader effectiveness:

Table 2.7: Expectations on the components of social leader effectiveness

	Accountability to Politicians (H)	Accountability to Politicians (L)
Accountability to Community (H)	**Constrained** • Low formal access • Low informal access	**Social-oriented** • High formal access • Low informal access
Accountability to Community (L)	**Patronage-captured** • Low formal access • High informal access	**Autonomous** • High formal access • High informal access

I expect that communities where the social leader is constrained are limited in formal and informal access to resources. When community leaders are unable to generate neighborhood improvements through their patronage work, they are frequently removed from leadership positions. The turnover in this position limits the build-up of bureaucratic knowledge needed to address community needs through formal channels. Constrained social leaders also cannot credibly threaten to switch political camps so they have lower bargaining power in negotiating resources in exchange for community support. I expect these communities to have less bureaucratic knowledge, lower tenure rates for leaders, and view themselves as unable to request favors from local government.

Social-oriented community organizations face similar challenges access resources formally because of the expected high turnover. Since the community cohesive-

ness necessary to hold social leaders accountable can translate into other forms of collective action like voter mobilization, leaders in social-oriented communities also have a large ability to access resources informally by requesting favors from political allies because they can credibly threaten to switch candidates in future election rounds. I expect that social-oriented community leaders have high formal access, moderate tenure rates, but view themselves as unable to access resources informally from local government.

Patronage-captured social leaders work towards promotion, so I expect that they would move out of their positions when the candidate they back wins an election, but they have sufficient informal access to patronage resources from their connections with candidates. An emphasis on finding neighborhood solutions through political candidates makes these leaders less knowledgeable about municipal bureaucracy. I expect that patronage-captured social leaders would have limited formal access, short tenure rates, but view themselves as able to access resources informally through patronage networks.

Autonomous leaders face no re-election challenges despite potential poor performance and political bosses have little recourse to mobilize voters in these communities without negotiating with local leaders. This long tenure generates formal access throough buit-up bureaucratic knowledge so autonomous leaders often have the tools for filing claims in municipal government. Local leaders in autonomous

communities can access resources informally through requesting favors when they are vital to voter mobilization, however political campaigns may eschew working with autonomous leaders because of the risk of shirking. I expect that autonomous leaders will have formal access to resources, long records of serving in leadership positions, and view themselves as able to access resources informally through requesting favors from local government.

A summary of the observable expectations resulting from this typology is included below:

Table 2.8: Observable expectations

	Constrained	Social-Oriented	Patronage-Captured	Autonomous
Leadership Tenure	Short	Medium	Short	Long
Knowledge of Local Community	Assumed High	Assumed High	Assumed High	Assumed High
Formal Access	Low	High	Low	High
Informal Access	Low	Low	High	High
Overall Effectiveness	Poor	Good	Average	Good

The table below depicts the different measures for each element of observable expectations from the theory. Outcomes of interest were measured through the

interview portion of the survey. This approach of collecting long-answer responses, while time-consuming, provides richer contextual variation in the outcomes, better demonstrates responses on abstract outcomes like effectiveness at attracting resources, and serve as a validity check for the survey responses.

Table 2.9: Survey questions relevant to observable expectations

	Relevant Questions and Coding Decisions
Leadership Tenure	**Relevant Questions:** How long have you been in JAC leadership? (in years)
Knowledge of Local Community	N/A - assumed high
Formal Access	**Relevant Questions:** What is the last thing someone in your community asked you for help with? Can you usually help residents with their problems or is it not possible? **Coding Decisions:** If, over the course of the interview, respondents could list petitions and solicitations that they had made that corresponded to plausibly correct entities, then assigned "high" formal resource access. If leaders described challenges in submitting documents, or lamented the lack of progress on their petitions, they were described as "low." Leaders who claimed the distance made accessing bureaucracy difficult were coded as "low."

Continued on next page

Table 2.9 – continued from previous page

	Relevant Questions and Coding Decisions
Informal Access	**Relevant Questions:** Do you think people in the city government where you live would be willing to help you? When you need something done who do you go to for help? **Coding Decisions:** Leaders who described their accomplishments as a result of favors were coded as "high informal access" as were leaders who claimed they turned to friends or family-members to help them access resources from outside the community. Importantly, this does not include leaders who asked their neighbors to chip-in on developing public goods. Leaders who explicitly lamented their isolation or lack of relationships with people who could help them were coded as "low."
Resource Attraction Effectiveness	**Coding Decisions:** Holistic approach judging the sentiment of local leaders, as well as evidence that they had gotten resources from outside the community to accomplish things in the neighborhood. Leaders who described their communities as "abandoned" or "forgotten" were considered to have low resource attraction effectiveness. Leaders that were able to describe multiple public works or successful community development initiatives were considered to have high resource attraction effectiveness. Some leaders could only describe one successful case, and others did not provide enough information to judge their performance. Those cases were sorted into the moderate and unknown category. It is important to note that this assessment judged the leader's effectiveness of generating resources from outside of the community. This assessment leaves out self-generated development, something that is both more challenging and perhaps more important for overall well-being in the neighborhood. Motivating community members in collective action is an important community leader role, but should best be explored through a research design that incorporates the opinions and feedback from community members.

Exploring just community accountability or political accountability alone, as is common in recent literature on clientelism and brokerage, does not account for much of the variation in effectiveness of social leaders in the sample.

Of the leaders contacted in the survey, 20 of them scored a "0" on community accountability, 35 scored a "1" meaning either they were competitively elected in the past or face a competitive election in the future, and 9 scored a "2" meaning they experienced both prior and future electoral accountability. Just over half of the leaders in the survey did not face a competitor in the previous election, underscoring the rarity of even minimally competitive selection for local leaders. When mapped onto effectiveness scores, the variation in community-based accountability (through elections) explains very little of the variation in effectiveness. The table below shows that respondents scoring a 0 on community-accountability are fairly evenly spread across effectiveness scores, whereas a minority of those scoring a 1 or a 2 on community accountability were scored as effective. Community accountability, at least electorally speaking, appears to hurt local leader effectiveness rather than help it and lacks full explanatory power.

Table 2.10: Resource Attraction by Community Accountability Score

Effectiveness	Community Accountability (0)	Community Accountability (1)	Community Accountability (2)
High	7 (35%)	7 (20%)	2 (22%)
Moderate and Unknown	5 (25%)	14 (40%)	4 (44%)
Low	8 (40%)	14 (40%)	3 (33%)

On the political accountability scale, 49, or close to 3/4 of those interviewed scored "0" meaning they had alternative options or did not rely on local politicians or local government for resources. While this scoring system undoubtedly does not capture all of the aspects of political accountability, the majority of leaders our team spoke with did not primarily seek out political or local funds to solve community problems. Instead, many attempted to solve problems within the community, by turning to large corporations, or not to solve them at all. Thirteen of the respondents had access to resources through private companies including FENOCO and Drummond because of those companies' state-required social impact funds and thus did not need to turn to elected officials or the bureaucracies they control for resources. Only five respondents scored a 1 on this scale, meaning they relied on resources from politicians or local governments but did not think politicians could tell how their communities voted. Another 10 respondents scored a 2 because they relied on politicians or government for resources and believed politicians could tell how people voted in their communities.

Table 2.11: Resource Attraction by Political Accountability Score

Effectiveness	Political Accountability (0)	Political Accountability (1)	Political Accountability (2)
High	9 (18%)	2 (40%)	5 (50%)
Moderate and Unknown	20 (41%)	1 (20%)	2 (20%)
Low	20 (41%)	2 (40%)	3 (30%)

A number of those who scored a two on political accountability claimed they worked frequently with political parties or candidates for office, but many felt cheated by the process. One leader described it as "filling us with lies"[40] and another felt promises from politicians "went the other way, because we are not there [in the city] and here we can't take charge [of political candidates]"[41] Another leader had been a candidate for city council in the past, and leveraged that political affiliation to great success including acquiring improvements in public lighting projects, sewage systems, street pavement, a fire station, and a park while also helping residents register for social welfare payments.[42]

Political accountability and community accountability alone leave a lot of variation in resource attraction effectiveness unexplained. Does considering them together provide any clarity? In the following section, I explore whether this typology informs the degree to which social leaders have formal access to resources through

[40]Interview 2188
[41]Interview 686
[42]Interview 4228

navigating bureaucracy, informal access to resources through favor-requesting, and their effectiveness at bringing resources into their community.

When looking at formal access to resources across the different types, there are no major differences between the type assigned and the level of formal access. Social-oriented, autonomous, and patronage-captured leaders were equally split across the different levels of formal access ranging from leaders who could name different social welfare offices to those who felt the city bureaucracy was complex and inaccessible. Constrained leaders were the only leader type where formal access through bureaucratic knowledge is more prominent. Only 1 or the 9 constrained leaders who completed the interview had low ability to access to resources formally (out of 20 constrained leaders surveyed). Due to the high level of attrition among transcripts of constrained leaders who completed the survey, drawing generalizations from this population is difficult.

Table 2.12: Formal Resource Access by Leader Type

	Formal Access (High)	Formal Access (Low)	Formal Access (Unknown)
Constrained	4 (44%)	1 (11%)	4 (44%)
Patronage-Captured	2 (40%)	2 (40%)	1 (20%)
Autonomous	4 (31%)	4 (31%)	5 (38%)
Social-Oriented	12 (35%)	11 (31%)	11 (31%)

The ability for leaders to access resources informally through requesting favors varies more substantially than formal resource access across types. While constrained and social-oriented leaders are roughly equally likely to be able to request favors as not, patronage-captured and autonomous leaders display opposite trends. Four out of the 5 patronage-captured leaders that I have interview transcripts for displayed a high capacity for favor requesting, and often referred to public officials or politicians by their names rather than titles. This finding is not surprising since most community leaders who opt to work with political parties do so because they expect to build long-term relationships with candidates that they can leverage for community improvements or personal advancement. In contrast, ten out of fourteen autonomous social leaders reported that they had no one to turn to outside of the community. Many described relationships as important in asking for things from city government and felt that they lacked sufficient ties through friendship or family to ask for help.

Table 2.13: Informal Resource Access by Leader Type

	Informal Access (High)	Informal Access (Low)	Informal Access (Unknown)
Constrained	3 (33%)	4 (44%)	2 (22%)
Patronage-Captured	4 (80%)	1 (20%)	0 (0%)
Autonomous	4 (29%)	10 (71%)	0 (00%)
Social-Oriented	14 (42%)	14 (42%)	5 (15%)

Some leader types were more effective at attracting resources and assistance from outside the community than others, based on their own self-reported evidence. Patronage-captured leaders tended to be effective, whereas many autonomous and social-oriented leaders faced more challenges and described themselves overall as less effective. Constrained actors were equally split between high and low effectiveness. This result is directly opposite of what I expected. Expectations from the theory suggested that Autonomous and social-oriented leaders would have the highest level of effectiveness, but instead are more likely to be ineffective.

Geography could be driving some of these effects since rural areas face difficulty in accessing state bureaucracy and are sometimes too remote to be included in campaigns. Of autonomous CAB presidents, 70% are in rural areas. Of the au-

Table 2.14: Resource Attraction Effectiveness by Leader Type

	Effectiveness (High)	Effectiveness (Low)	Effectiveness (Moderate and Unknown)
Constrained	4 (40%)	4 (40%)	2 (20%)
Patronage-Captured	3 (60%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)
Autonomous	4 (27%)	7 (47%)	4 (27%)
Social-Oriented	5 (15%)	13 (38%)	16 (47%)

tonomous leaders in the high effectiveness category, 75% were in urban areas.[43] The one patronage-captured leader in the low effectiveness category was located in a rural area. Since ruralness is not distributed as-if random across the types, it's very possible that rural status drove both classification in the typology and resource attraction effectiveness scores.

Urban leaders had no particular advantage in informal resource access through favors, but had far greater formal access to bureaucracy. Multiple leaders lamented their physical distance from the state as a primary reason that their neighborhood lacked adequate resources. One leader interviewed described how the distance from their village to the main road – a five hour hike on foot down a path that's impassible to motorcycles hampered their efforts to check back in on petitions and solicitations. They noted that "people in the mayor's office have an obligation to

[43]70% of autonomous leaders were located in rural areas; 30% of constrained leaders; 33% of patronage-captured leaders; 42% of social-oriented leaders

help us, but I'm not sure if they take our documents or put them in the trash."[44] In my own research I found that navigating bureaucracy in Colombia required multiple trips and long wait times between filing paperwork, and having it rejected for seemingly arbitrary reasons. For my solicitations to be accepted, I often had to spend days at a time waiting in office lobbies for the right person to be there. Living in a rural area would have made accessing the bureaucracy in ways that I did incredibly costly. As one leader describes it, "The only way to speak with them is to go to [the city] because they never come here... I work and so I can't be going back and forth to [the city] all of the time."[45]

During my field work in Santa Marta, the incumbent mayor attempted to address some of these rural access issues by holding "equity fairs" in the rural periphery of the municipality where representatives of city bureaucracy would provide advice and collect solicitations from local leaders and residents. These fairs undoubtedly increased access but haven't addressed the underlying distance between leaders and the formal state.

Under my original expectations, autonomous leaders would have the longest tenure in office compared to all other leader types because they faced no competitive pressures from the community and little opportunity for political career advancement. Comparing the time in office across the different leader types shows a different

[44]Interview 4390
[45]Interview 1354

trend. Autonomous leaders that I interviewed have the shortest average length of time in office, and the least variation in time – just over 4 years or one full term. Patronage-captured leaders have the second lowest average length of office-holding at just over five years, while social-oriented and constrained leaders tend to stay in office the longest. Constrained leaders ranged from 4 years in office to twenty-five. The constrained leaders who had been in office for 16, 20, and 25 years don't appear to face as many constraints as theorized, but fall in this category because they were running for reelection in the future but did not yet know if they would face a challenger.[46] Social-oriented leaders also stayed in office longer than expected, with an average of six years. This and data from other chapters of the dissertation suggest that leaders may be choosing to retire when they find the job disheartening or are ineffective at attracting resources rather than facing pressure from the community to perform.

Measurement and selection issues challenge inferences from this data. First, I was only able to capture electoral-based community accountability and not more informal feelings of social pressure from community members that may play a heavier role on inducing leader to perform well. Decisions to run f or election again, and whether they face a competitor are also closely tied to performance as those who are ineffective at generating resources for community projects want to retire and

[46]I marked these as community accountable since they weren't able to rule out that they would face a challenger. In this case, that decision may have been incorrect.



Figure 2.1: Years in office by leader type

may face more challengers.

While we had a complete list of registered Communal Action Board presidents in Magdalena, my research team found that many numbers had been changed, and phone reception varied throughout the department. The sample lacked unregistered communal action boards, which one leader claimed were more common than registered boards in her community. Those who were not willing to participate in the second-half of the interview with open-ended questions and or did not have those responses recorded were disproportionately leaders who were constrained

and leaders who were autonomous. Half of all constrained survey respondents did not have interview transcripts, and 65% of autonomous leaders who completed the survey did not have transcripts. Most of the missing-ness under constrained and autonomous leaders was due to poor phone reception, which made it difficult for my research assistants to record the call, but a number of constrained leaders opted to have my research assistants take notes on their conversation rather than record their call. Future work with this population should take this selection effect seriously.

2.6 Conclusion

The typology and results from this paper make the case that scholars of clientelism should simultaneously consider the top-down and bottom-up forces that constrain broker behavior. Brokers who are autonomous, social-oriented, constrained, and patronage-captured are distinct types with different experiences navigating neighborhood development and diverging levels of success. The distribution of these distinct types across respondents suggest that patronage-captured types are far less common among communal action board leaders than emphasized in well-cited literature from other South American contexts.

Some leaders were more effective at accessing resources for their community than others. Patronage-captured leaders had the highest effectiveness rate, while social-oriented and autonomous leaders were more likely to be ineffective. This stands in contrast with my expectation that autonomous and social-oriented leaders would

perform the best, patronage-captured leaders to have average performance, and constrained leaders to perform poorly. These results may be due to underlying conditions or structural factors that affect both the categorization of leaders and their effectiveness, including location, whether leaders run for reelection, and factors I did not collect data on like the gender and race of local leaders.

More research should examine the conditions under which variation in leader type arises. While much of the variation in leader type may be due to individual leader preferences and decisions, contextual factors like presence next to a railroad or distance to a polling place may influence the type of leadership in a certain community. Similarly, individual factors like age, gender, race, or, in Colombia, exposure to armed actors, could play a role in within-community changes in leader type. Understanding when certain types of leaders are more common will help produce identification strategies for causal inference on the impact of leader type on a variety of things political scientists care about like voter turnout, political participation, public goods provision, gender equity, and more.

Future work should further explore the role of private companies like banana farms, coal mines, railroads, and other entities working on public lands in substituting for the state and empowering local leaders. Part of Colombia's mandated social responsibility policy for private companies involves support to communities within the environmental impact area. Comparing communities inside and outside of the

economic impact area of these large companies could yield valuable insights on the role that the presence of private companies plays in the balance of power between community leaders and politicians.

Another valuable avenue for future research is to explore the community conditions under each of these typology categories through site visits and interviews with residents. More in-depth case studies of communities that fall along these category could reveal important differences in the lived experience of communal life and help explain why some communities end up with leaders facing varying forms of constraints.

CHAPTER III

Do Elections for Brokers Yield Better Candidates for Public Office?

3.1 Introduction

Communal action boards (CABs) in Colombia substitute for weak state capacity and weak political parties by providing a grassroots link between everyday people, municipal services, and political candidates. The linkages they create are meant to be credible because of the grassroots nature of the institution, but communal action boards are plagued by low support and concern among neighborhood residents about elite capture despite being composed through certified neighborhood-level elections. Many interviews I conducted in communities included complaints like this one: "She takes money from politicians, and gives it to her friends. You know how things work here... That's why we have these half-built projects... When she calls a meeting these days, nobody comes."[1] In other neighborhoods though, board presidents actively solicit grassroots insight into the most pressing community issues and address them, usually by taking money from politicians in exchange for

[1] field notes March 2019

turnout commitments. In both cases, local leaders are working as political brokers with the same formal institutional constraints, but completely different development outcomes and community relationships. Why do some neighborhood leaders, performing the same brokerage job, have such different outcomes? I join a growing field of research investigating how accountability structures within clientelism can impact development outcomes through constraints on broker behavior and relationships between potential brokers and political patrons.

Accountability between politicians, brokers, and voters is hierarchical and top-down in dominant theories of clientelism (Hicken, 2011). Voters as agents are thought to be accountable to brokers as principals and brokers as agents are thought to be accountable to politicians as principals. More recent work challenges the assumption of hierarchical top-down motivations with politicians at the top and voters at the bottom, instead finding that brokers are often caught between two informal sources accountability: politicians and voters. The balance between these two sources of accountability creates trade-offs with implications for community development, resource distribution, and competitive democratic elections. In this paper I explore the effect of bottom-up accountability on whether social leaders engage in political mobilization and the way that leaders acting as brokers select the candidates they work with.

I conducted semi-structured interviews and surveys asking social leaders about

their relationship with city government, belief that working with candidates yields valuable benefits for their communities, and their proclivity to engage in political mobilization efforts. I also ask these social leaders, many of whom engage in mobilization, to rank their preferences on types of candidate characteristics through pairwise comparisons. Following previous findings in the literature, I expected that brokers running for their own reelection would be more responsive to public goods offers than their retiring peers. I further explore whether impending leader elections affects a leader's permissiveness of undesirable candidate traits like corruption allegations. Data from interviews with local neighborhood leaders show a stark difference among social leaders who are and are not seeking reelection. Interviews show that social leaders believe that bringing public benefits to their community is key to their survival in leadership, and many view political mobilization work for candidates as their only viable path to generating the local improvements the community wants. Both those running for reelection and those not seeking another term preferred candidates that offered community benefits, but leaders facing reelection were more likely to work with potentially corrupt candidates to secure neighborhood improvements. Findings are limited, however, by using self-reported data on reelection intent and knowledge of a challenger. A leader's reelection incentives and those of her challenger are not randomly assigned and plausibly related to unmeasured characteristics in this study including the mobilizing ability of local leaders so findings are exploratory.

The literature gap in our understanding on delegation between brokers and voters is only recently beginning to fill. This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. Preliminary results contribute to a growing literature on voter preferences for corrupt candidates, while also documenting existing variation in accountability structures of brokers through data collection during Colombia's neighborhood leader elections. We know that more accountable brokers generate greater benefits for voters (Auerbach, 2016; Gottlieb, 2017; Nathan, 2019). I extend these recent findings to show that brokers facing reelections value different candidate characteristics, meaning that broker accountability can substantively change the make-up of representative institutions, and engage with politics in different ways than those who do not face reelection. The data also raises new questions about the role of accountability structures for community social leaders - subjecting local leaders to formal election processes may perversely incentivize increased political engagement through clientelism, even if those relationships shift towards fulfilling neighborhood needs rather than individual payoffs.

3.2 Are Brokers Responsive to Voter Concerns?

Politicians delegate voter mobilization efforts to brokers because they have greater and more specialized information about voter behavior. Brokers encourage voters to vote for certain candidates through positive inducements like the provision of welfare benefits or negative inducements like the threat of removal of benefits (Mares and Young, 2016b). Voters in this model are thought to be largely reliant on brokers to receive crucial medicine or public employment such that regardless of

the type of inducement, particularly poor voters must comply. If they defect, they could be cut from all future benefits through a grim trigger strategy (Szwarcberg, 2015; Stokes, 2005). Stokes (2005) labels this relationship as "perverse accountability" because the threat of coercive punishment in a repeated game makes voters accountable to brokers rather than the reverse.

While evidence suggests that politicians monitor brokers for their turnout effort (Larreguy et al., 2014), the ability of brokers to monitor voters is increasingly contested. Brokers rarely monitor voters, many voters believe that their ballot is secret, and brokers often lack an intuitive knowledge about voter tendencies, presenting challenges to the hierarchical model of clientelism. Instead, politicians employ brokers to distribute goods prior to an election in order to signal candidate viability (Muñoz, 2014), imply future transfers (Kramon, 2016) and encourage peer-to-peer persuasion (Schaffer and Baker, 2015) among others. Voters comply with these exchanges because they have strong norms of reciprocity (Chang, 2017; Lawson and Greene, 2014), or they take cues from esteemed brokers on which candidate would benefit them the most (Baldwin, 2013).

Brokers are reliant on their persuasive influence over a large voting bloc in order to strike better bargains with politicians, which can induce an informal accountability mechanism. Camp finds that brokers who can credibly threaten to transfer their support behind an opposing candidate can extract a greater cost per vote

than those who lack this credible threat, and the best brokers are ones who maintain community goodwill (2017). An emphasis on generating community goodwill explains why many brokers engage in "social work" during non-electoral periods in Argentina (Zarazaga, 2014). Given that brokers are rarely able to monitor behavior inside a voting booth, a positive reputation in the community both heightens the persuasive power of brokers (such that monitoring is not necessary) and increases the benefits that brokers can extract from politicians through a credible threat of switching support (Camp, 2017). A broker's choice of persuasion as a strategy over extortion and inducement is most likely when the broker was selected through a competitive process rather than a hereditary one (Gottlieb, 2017).

Accountable brokers like locally elected community leaders can be key to increasing development in communities where they work. While brokers can be altruistically community-minded (Baldwin, 2013), brokers can also seek rents from their position by pocketing a portion of the payment from politicians directed toward voters (Szwarcberg, 2015). In India, slums where brokers faced competition from other brokers of the same party had more paved roads, streetlights, medical camps, trash collection, water access, and sewage connectivity than slums dominated by brokers from different parties (Auerbach, 2016). Brokers who had to compete for their voter bloc engaged in more social work and developed better political connections than brokers in communities with less options for representation (Auerbach, 2016). Nathan finds that local chiefs in northern Ghana who were selected through more

competitive processes generate greater development advances among a series of different indicators than chiefs selected with less competition (2019). In Brazil, brokers are often so reliant on maintaining their voting bloc that they dedicate their own money to fulfilling voter requests (Nichter and Peress, 2017). These results point to broker accountability and competition as prime means for voters to gain benefits even through non-programmatic means by limiting the amount that a broker can pocket relative to the amount they redistribute.

A growing literature in political science has highlighted that voters can, in some circumstances, prefer traditionally less desirable candidate traits like corruption because they believe corrupt candidates are more likely to accomplish things that will benefit voters. Corruption flourishes in many strong democracies, despite opportunities during elections to remove corrupt candidates from office and an electorate that is largely aware of corruption's pervasiveness. Instead, voters may be responding to information about corruption in context with their beliefs on how politics works(Faller, 2015). For instance, Faller (2015) finds that voters in Uganda perceive the political system to be highly corrupt, and therefore reduce the benefits from voting for a clean candidates, and potentially increase the benefits to electing a corrupt candidate that works within a corrupt system. Similarly, voters sometimes prefer candidates who engage in criminal and corrupt activity because those candidates are best able to protect and provide for voters in the context of failing governance institutions like rule of law and state bureaucracy in

India (Vaishnav, 2017). Extending these findings to social leaders acting as brokers may suggest that accountable brokers also support corrupt candidates because of election pressures, not in spite of them.

3.3 Theory

When brokers are community leaders who want to make improvements to their neighborhood, gain an income, or rise up in a political party, they usually need to build relationships with candidates for public office, push those candidates to provide funds and support for projects, and expend time and resources turning out voters in support of the candidate. This process is costly personally for individual leaders who then have three choices to recoup the costs:

- bear the cost of building these relationships in expectation of access to a better neighborhood and social esteem or a future political career,
- pocket a percentage of the funds received for neighborhood development, or
- not engage at all.

Bottom up accountability through community social pressure or formal elections push community leaders towards engaging with candidates for public office as brokers, and dictate the degree to which they can skim off the top. Community leaders facing high levels of bottom-up accountability are pushed towards bearing the cost of the investment in order to keep their leadership positions. Community leaders facing low bottom-up accountability can engage in mobilization to generate their

own private goods by pocketing the reward for mobilizing voters, or opt out of brokerage positions entirely.

Given that a social leader chooses to engage in voter mobilization, bottom-up accountability should push brokers towards bearing the costs rather than pocketing a percentage of the funds. While some communities are small enough that social leaders could distribute cash handouts while keeping very little of the investment for themselves, economies of scale and social esteem likely push leaders towards generating neighborhood-level improvements like water tanks, parks, or road pavement. Accountability encourages community leaders to act like brokers, but also encourages the product of brokerage to be more pro-social.

Bottom-up accountability may also play a role in the selection of candidates based on non-distributive evaluations of candidate quality. Brokers often publicize a slate of candidates that they endorse prior to elections, and voters may have prior information on some candidates. If voters have a prior belief that a candidate that the broker endorsed is a "bad type," voters could plausibly form a negative opinion of the broker and wish to replace him or her with a new community leader. If community leaders believe that voters will evaluate them based on the type of candidate they choose to work with, leaders facing competitive elections would be less permissive of undesirable candidate traits like allegations of corruption or a lack of experience when conducting brokerage work.

If community leaders believe instead that voters evaluate them based on their ability to produce public or private goods alone, community leaders facing competitive elections may be more permissive of these traits in their work as brokers. Voters in Latin America tend to have poor prior opinions of political actors (Mainwaring, 2006) so it is reasonable to believe that voters lack variation in their prior evaluations of candidate quality. If voters did have good access to information on candidate quality, community leaders acting as brokers may still tolerate undesirable candidate traits if they believe that public goods provision is more central to voter evaluation of their performance.

Community leaders are most accountable to voters, at least electorally, when they face competition for their position. Whether community leaders are elected in neighborhood contests or selected informally based on their community connections and reputation, voters are not always able to freely withdraw support from a broker they believe is performing poorly. If community leaders control access to vital resources, withdrawing support can have prohibitive economic costs. Furthermore, criminal gangs and armed groups actively back certain grassroots leaders, and some local leaders in Colombia can throw elections by manipulating voter rosters which poses a threat to bottom-up accountability. In these cases the trappings of elections would not create sufficient accountability conditions required to produce behavioral changes in leaders and their subsequent work as brokers.

This leads to the following testable hypothesis using a survey of community leaders:

> **Hypothesis 1:** Leaders facing bottom-up accountability will be more likely to mobilize voters.
>
> **Hypothesis 2:** Leaders facing bottom-up accountability will be more likely to favor candidates that offer public benefits for the neighborhood over candidates offering personal benefits.
>
> **Hypothesis 3a:** Leaders facing bottom-up accountability will be more permissive of undesirable candidate traits.
>
> **Hypothesis 3b:** Leaders facing bottom-up accountability will be less permissive of undesirable candidate traits.

3.4 The Colombian Case

While social leaders in democracies around the world face similar choices whether to engage in political mobilization and similar principal-agent constraints on their behavior as brokers, Colombia provides a unique opportunity to see a formalized version of bottom-up accountability in action since social leaders in Colombia are formally elected and officially non-partisan neighborhood representatives in a weak party system reliant on brokerage. Brokers in other contexts are often involved in grassroots governance activities and rely on the community goodwill generated through these activities to accomplish brokerage tasks (Zarazaga, 2014), but the

mechanism by which voters hold brokers accountable in informal settings is less transparent. Brokers are formally elected in other contexts including councilors in Argentina (Szwarcberg, 2012) and chiefs of certain ethnic groups in Senegal (Gottlieb, 2017) among others so there are numerous cases where brokers would receive similarly strong cues about their competition from year to year. Colombia also has substantial variation in broker behavior, ranging from acting as substitutes for the state to working as a political machine, combined with substantial variation in the level of bottom-up accountability as measured by leader election competitiveness.

Communal action board (CAB) leadership elections occur the last Sunday of April every four years.[2] The leadership team is made up of a president, vice president, treasurer, secretary, and a variety of smaller posts including delegates, councilors, and sub-committee chairs. The neighborhood CAB president is the *de-facto* leader and other positions tend not to be involved in brokerage work. Neighborhood elections in the study's field site, Santa Marta, are conducted via candidate slates but in other parts of Colombia, candidates are elected via non-partisan lists using a quotient rule. Elections for local and state positions are usually held 6 months prior to the neighborhood leadership elections, so the brokerage choices that CAB presidents made in the previous election are still fresh in minds of voters at the time they evaluate CAB president performance.

[2]The elections this year are postponed indefinitely because of the pandemic.

Colombia instituted a nation-wide quarantine with very strict rules surrounding the movement of people in response to COVID-19. The quarantine began on March 24 and only began to ease as of July 2020. Nation-wide quarantines particularly affect the livelihoods of Colombians who mostly work in informal labor positions where they cannot take advantage of the social safety net and are unable to work remotely. In response, national and local governments are instituting cash transfer programs and food deliveries to vulnerable families who do not qualify for existing social welfare programs, but needs exceed supplies which has resulted in allegations of preferential disbursement. Communal action board leaders are taking an active role in advocating for their neighborhood's needs by documenting the extent and type of assistance required, but there appear to be few formal mechanisms to collect this information at the city level.

All public events in Colombia have been canceled and the timeline for submitting forms in advance of the CAB elections have also shifted in response. The municipal government of Santa Marta has not yet decided a new date for CAB elections, but they will be delayed over a year. As such I rely on self-reported interest in running for reelection rather than actual election results. Reelection intentions are also less clear during this period than in the past, as many people who would otherwise be predisposed to run for reelection responded that they felt unsure about running because there was no official election date. I was also unable to determine whether others were planning to run against the incumbent as the registration period to

run for reelection has also expanded.

3.5 Research Design

I use two related sources of data to understand the empirical implications of the theory: qualitative interviews, a discrete choice experiment conducted before the pandemic using a sample of social leaders in Colombia, and pairwise comparison data collected over the phone from a non-random sample of social leaders between April and May. The structured interviews covered topics including what residents typical ask of neighborhood leaders, whether the respondent had engaged in voter mobilization, whether they felt there were benefits from mobilization, and their relationship with the city government. I compare responses to these questions under different degrees of bottom-up accountability measured through survey responses on communal action board election status. To understand the preferences that local leaders have for candidates that they may work with, I look at discrete choice and pairwise comparison data on candidate attributes. Unfortunately, my team was only able to collect a small sample for the discrete choice experiment, which was far insufficient to infer interaction effects between the items in the experiment and the level of competition. As such, I present the discrete choice results as a way to suggest that brokers do indeed have discernible preferences for the kinds of candidates they work with. The hypothesis related to preferences over candidate attributes are instead largely tested with pairwise comparison data, and grounded by an analysis of qualitative interview data.

Mobilizing voters can be a sensitive issue in Colombia and people have varied understandings of the concept. Because the topic is complex, I opted to interview social leaders on their experiences rather than use survey responses. The interview component includes conversations with social leaders over topics including experiences mobilizing voters, what kinds of benefits mobilizing voters can bring a neighborhood, and their relationship with city government, which provide additional background context. I use these interviews to assess whether leaders engaged in voter mobilization as brokers, and the kinds of benefits they received as a product of that mobilization. I expect that more accountable leaders are more likely to describe receiving public benefits as a result of their brokerage work. Due to the sensitive nature of receiving cash payments for political work, a very small number of responses hinted that social leaders were taking individual personal payments for mobilizing voters despite the true number potentially being far larger. Coding rules are described below, and the full interview script is included in Appendix B.

I coded mobilization inductively using the following rule to cluster responses:

Table 3.1: Interview Questions and Response Coding

Mobilization	
Relevant Question	*Do you help voters get to the polling place on election day*
Coding	Respondents were largely clustered among three types: Respondents who emphasized that they did not mobilize voters or get involved in politics at all, those who saw mobilizing voters during campaigns as an important role for CAB leaders, and those that emphasized they would only advise voters on potential candidates or serve as a resource. For analysis I grouped these responses into two categories: those that mobilize (including those who suggest) and those who isolate themselves from politics.
Mobilization Benefit	
Relevant Question	*In your experience, are there benefits to working with political candidates?*
Coding	I separated responses into two categories - those who could describe a public work that was brought to the neighborhood as a result of voter mobilization, and those that could not, either because they denied the presence of benefits, or the benefit they described was not public in the sense that only a small number of people would benefit.

To understand how leaders who engage in brokerage work understand candidate attributes, I use a discrete choice experiment and pairwise comparison of candidate attributes. A discrete choice experiment can provide a wealth of information about the impact of attributes on how brokers decide among candidates, but due to the outbreak of COVID-19 world-wide, we were only able to collect 34 responses. Nevertheless, this experiment allows us to understand how CAB presidents make

a choice in candidate endorsement. Conjoint experiments mimic real-world multi-dimensional decisions, like candidate selection, more closely than one-dimensional survey experiment designs, require less assumptions about the strategies by which people make decisions (Hainmueller et al., 2014) and have been used in a plethora of political science research understanding candidate choice. The experimental set-up is closely related to Mares and Visconti's 2019 experiment showing how voters respond to different forms of candidate malfeasance.

In the discrete choice experiment, respondents were shown two candidates that vary across 6 attributes and asked to choose one candidate from the pair to endorse (a "forced-choice" design). The process was repeated 6 times, meaning that each respondent saw a total of 12 candidate profiles. Two attributes in the experiment measured the marginal effect of inducement type on candidate endorsement and another attribute measured broker permissiveness of undesirable candidate traits. The final three attributes - area support, income, and experience - were included to increase the face-validity of the experiment for respondents and to allow some room for avoiding social desirability biases in selection. An example of the attributes for the discrete-choice experiment are included below:

Table 3.2: Candidate Attributes

Attribute	**Values**
Did the candidate win the last elections that s/he ran in?	Yes No
Are other CABs in the area supporting this candidate?	Yes Not yet decided
The candidate has a lot of income?	Yes, products of a business they manage No
Has the candidate made promises about benefits for this neighborhood?	Has promised to finance a program of your choice None
Has the candidate made any promises about individual benefits for the president of the CAB?	Yes, will provide particular benefits No
Is there an investigation open against the candidate on questions of political integrity?	None An investigation was closed due to lack of evidence There is an open investigation

Due to concerns about viral transmission during face-to-face interviews, the survey shifted to administration via phone interviews and we were unable to continue collecting conjoint experiment responses using that medium. Before the pandemic reached Colombia, my research assistants and I attended the *Secretaría de Gobierno* training sessions for the upcoming local elections to make contacts with CAB leaders. We were able to record phone numbers for a large portion of Santa Marta's CAB leaders, and utilized a snowball sampling method to make further contact with local leaders to be included in the sample. While our original plan was to visit local leaders in person to reduce non-response rates, we were unable to do that because of pandemic safety protocols.

In response to mandatory quarantine during the study timeline, health and safety concerns, and new restrictions on human subjects research, I shifted to collecting data on candidate attribute preferences through pairwise comparisons. The discrete choice experiment was impractical to enumerate verbally without visual cues, so I selected the four most theoretically interesting candidate attributes from the discrete choice experiment and solicited preferences through pairwise comparisons. Because of the style of the comparisons, each attribute was altered to be a conventionally positive characteristic. With four possible attributes, there are 6 unique combinations for comparison, and each pair was shown to the respondent, though the order within question and between questions was randomized to avoid bias. The most prominent disadvantages to this method of attribute pairwise comparisons are that interactions across different candidate traits are not detectable and the attributes were limited.

Candidates can offer brokers inducements that preference the broker over other members of the neighborhood. The discrete choice experiment used two options for personal inducements: a promise of particular benefits to people who mobilize voters on their behalf, or no personal inducements which I used as a neutral baseline category. In the pairwise comparison section, I included only a promise of particular benefits to supporters as a way to simplify the questions for audio-only enumeration. Candidates often also offer inducements before an election for com-

munal goods ranging from road pavement to youth groups that would be much harder for a broker to singularly benefit from. While my exploratory interview research suggested that road pavements were highly persuasive inducements and common in low-income neighborhoods, the experimental design required communal benefits that would be of a similar value across the neighborhoods in my sample irrespective of pre-existing infrastructure conditions, so I included a generic candidate promise to fund a project of the broker's choosing in their neighborhood and a baseline of no promises for neighborhood projects. In order to simplify the survey for the comparisons, I included only a generic candidate promise to fund a project in their neighborhood.

Political candidates are often imperfect and regularly face allegations of corruption or other objectionable behaviors. In Colombia, scandalous political attributes generally fall into one of three categories: electoral fraud, linkages with armed groups (*parapolítica*), or corruption in state contracting. Electoral fraud and armed group linkages are multi-dimensional concepts in Colombia and closely related to other aspects of the experimental design. Electoral fraud is closely related to brokerage work, so allegations of engaging in electoral fraud would have been more likely to influence the marginal effect of the inducement-related attributes rather than serve as a measurement for permissiveness of undesirable behavior on its own. Similarly, alleged links with armed groups can signal partisanship, insecurity, and support for communal institutions. These signals affect the brokers in my sample

differently based on unobservable characteristics like prior affiliation with armed groups, previous threats of violence, and orientation in the conflict, so armed group association would substantially complicate the experiment. In the discrete choice experiment, I included three variations on the theme of corruption - a candidate who was under investigation for corruption, a candidate who's corruption case had been closed due to lack of evidence and a candidate with no history of corruption allegations. For the comparisons, I include a simple allegation that the candidate has a reputation for not being corrupt. The comparison attributes are included below:

Question: *Would you prefer to support a candidate that [a] or [b]?*
Characteristics
1) Had a good likelihood of winning
2) Had a reputation for not being corrupt
3) Promised particular benefits to supporters
4) Promised to finance a project in your neighborhood

To measure bottom-up accountability, I focus on electoral accountability for social leaders. Some leaders face highly competitive elections for re-election while others run unopposed or opt not to run for reelection at all. The survey was enumerated two months before the planned Communal Action Board leadership elections in Santa Marta, Colombia, though the election has been postponed indefinitely. In Santa Marta, Communal Action Board leadership is elected via a

complete non-partisan slate (*plancha*).[3] Due to the postponement of the election, I collected information on whether the community leader reported that he or she was running in the election or deciding to step down from the position. Close to half of the respondents in the sample claimed that they were seeking reelection or potentially seeking reelection, while half said they did not want to seek reelection. Because of the year-long delay in neighborhood elections due to COVID, and that this interview was conducted at the very beginning of the pandemic, I assume that respondents who were unsure of their reelection plans lacked certainty because of the unusual circumstances and face similar motivation to comply with community demands as those who had firmer plans.

Of those running for reelection (or unsure of their reelection plans), twelve had no challenger yet, and fifteen were running against someone else. I combine survey responses on whether the respondent planned to run for reelection with their knowledge of challenger to create three accountability categories:

- Respondents not running for reelection are considered to have no accountability;
- Respondents running for reelection are considered to have low accountability;
- Respondents running for reelection and facing a challenger are considered to

[3]Especially small communal action boards, mostly in rural areas, are allowed to request an election by consensus without formal voting mechanisms, but the municipal director for communal action boards assured me this was very rare and almost never happens in urban areas.

have high accountability.

Ultimately this measure of bottom-up accountability is imperfect because it leaves out the informal social mechanisms for accountability that likely play a larger role in constraining behavior, particularly at the neighborhood level. Living in the same community and partaking in similar social events in many cases may motivate leaders to a greater extent than leader elections. As such, the data and analysis included in this paper can only be interpretted as contributing to our understanding of the role that electoral accountability plays in a community leader's decision to mobilize on behalf of political candidates and how they choose among candidates to work with.

Leaders themselves make a decision to run, and other residents of the neighborhood make a choice to run against incumbents, so neither can be thought of as random or exogenous to the outcomes collected, ultimately undermining any attempt at causal inference. Instead, the elections studied may serve as a sorting mechanism between leaders who can and will mobilize voters, and those who can't or won't. In the long-run leaders who enjoy, reluctantly engage in, and are able to do brokerage work are likely to stay in the position, while those who feel strongly against working with politicians or lack necessary skills to do so cycle out of office - not because they were voted out but because they choose not to continue their leadership roles. The research design itself cannot delineate between leaders who see bottom-

up accountability as constraining their behavior and leaders who, as a result of elections, cycle out based on type because they are observationally equivalent outcomes. I address in the discussion section how future work that may take place during a more normal neighborhood election cycle could gather more definitive information on the topic.

3.6 When do social leaders engage in brokerage?

The results from these interviews show immense variation in whether social leaders engage in politics through voter mobilization at all. In response to an interview question about whether respondents help voters get to the polls during local, territorial, and national elections, leaders were split between those who actively mobilized residents, those who mobilized voters more passively through suggesting candidates, and leaders who rejected political brokerage roles. The question was designed to subtly reference voter mobilization in a socially acceptable fashion, but nearly all respondents interpreted the question to be related directly to voter mobilization on behalf of political groups likely because voter mobilization is commonly associated with CAB leaders.

I expect that bottom-up accountability through community elections may encourage leaders to be involved in brokerage work to generate investments for their communities rather than opt out of brokerage. The table below shows the breakdown of mobilization activity across three categories of bottom-up accountability. The first column shows the distribution of voter mobilization across community

leaders who are not running for reelection. The second column shows mobilization across leaders who are running for reelection, but are not facing an opponent for their position. The third column shows leaders who are running for reelection against a challenger, and therefore face the greatest incentive to perform well.

Table 3.3: Voter Mobilization by Bottom-Up Accountability Level

	No Reelection	Reelection	Reelection Competition
Mobilization	16 (55%)	9 (90%)	9 (82%)
No Mobilization	13 (45%)	1 (10%)	2 (18%)

Leaders not running for reelection are roughly equally likely to work as brokers as not, but leaders running for reelection, regardless of whether they face a challenger or not, overwhelmingly mobilize voters through brokerage work. Consistent with expectations, bottom-up accountability through the form of elections pushes social leaders into brokerage work, but facing a challenger for their position doesn't seem to change behavioral incentives substantially. Just over half of leaders who are not opting to run again also engaged in brokerage work, so community-based behavioral constraints from elections are not necessary for leaders to opt in to brokerage work.

The two leaders who did not engage in brokerage work but were facing competitive reelection contests both still recognized the importance of political mobilization for their community. One leader in this category worked before elections to make

sure that residents in her neighborhood were registered to vote at the polling place closest to the neighborhood.[4] Ensuring that all residents are voting in the closest polling place increases the visibility of the community's vote bank. In my field work in Santa Marta multiple leaders mentioned that getting residents to coordinate to vote at one polling place was a difficult task but necessary to demonstrate their political impact and generate investment in the community. Another leader described how he "does his political work not necessarily in the neighborhood that I live in, but always with my family and my group of friends."[5] The one respondent who was running for reelection with no challenger and reported no mobilization efforts noted that he and most people in the neighborhood voted the way their employer told them to because of "labor commitments."[6]

Looking just at those who engaged in brokerage work, the majority of communal action board presidents reported community development benefits from working with candidates for public office. Leaders who were running for reelection and those running against an opponent were both slightly more likely to report that there were benefits from brokerage work. Social leaders who engaged in brokerage, but were not running for reelection were the most likely to report that there were no benefits from working with candidates for public office. The difference between community leaders across accountability categories is slight.

[4]Interview 5176
[5]Interview 7774
[6]Interview 8065

Table 3.4: Benefits from Brokerage Work

	No Reelection	Reelection	Reelection Competition
Benefits	5 (55%)	5 (71%)	3 (60%)
No Benefits	4 (45%)	2 (29%)	2 (40%)

Both of these results could be driven by self-selection. The decision to run for reelection is likely related to the ability to get things done during their term. Leaders who don't engage in politics as brokers, either because they lack the networks and knowledge or because of a normative stance, are less able to get things done, and may therefore decide to quit. Having a competitor may also be a product of poor performance. Leaders generating a lot of positive community development are less likely to see someone run against them for community leadership than those who are performing poorly. Given the data limitations, I used whether leaders were running for reelection and faced a challenger, but leaders who lack a challengers may not necessarily be less accountable than those who do.

To understand the effect of competitive elections further, I looked at the breakdown of brokerage work on the length of time that leaders had been in office. Of the respondents, 24 were in their first term, 10 were in their second term, and 14 had been in office for more than two terms. Results similarly showed that those in office for longer were more prolific vote mobilizers than those in office for just one term. Taken together, the interview data suggests that leaders in Santa Marta who mobilize voters stay in office longer for two possible reasons. Either, mobilizing and non-mobilizing types select into community leadership position, but only

mobilizing types opt to stay longer. Some interview responses support this interpretation - almost all of the leaders who were adamant that CABs should not be involved in electoral politics at all elected not to run again. Alternatively, leaders who face reelection pressures feel required to mobilize voters in order to generate neighborhood improvements, whereas those who don't face reelection pressures do not. All respondents who have been in office for two terms or more and planned to run for reelection mobilized voters for elections, however this wouldn't explain why a substantial number of respondents (12) who were not running for reelection engaged in voter mobilization anyway.

These trends have potential impact for unequal development. Those who are not running for reelection disproportionately believe the city government does not care about their communities and that there are no benefits to mobilizing voters for electoral politics. While this is likely a selection effect where leaders who believe they lack power tend to retire, this could still have lasting effects on neighborhoods. Among those that mobilized voters, 13 thought there were benefits to working with politicians and 8 did not believe they had received any benefits despite their efforts. Only one leader who thought there were benefits to working with politicians decided not to mobilize voters because "many candidates forget their promises to those that helped them after they are elected."[7] The rest of the community presidents who opted to not mobilize voters felt there were no benefits to electoral mobilization. Most leaders who did not mobilize voters similarly felt

[7]Interview 5176

that the city government doesn't care about them.

In the next section, I explore how accountability impacts the way that leaders acting as brokers decide what candidates to work with and the way they value candidate offers and attributes.

3.7 Discrete Choice Experiment and Pairwise Comparison Survey Results

Because the outcome in a discrete-choice experiment or a pairwise comparison with two choices is binary, I analyze the results using a logistic regression with dummy variables for each attribute and interaction effects between the level of competition and the attributes of interest. Each observation is a candidate profile shown to a respondent in the experiment, leading to 360 total candidates, which is far short of the expected 1,800 total candidates in the pre-COVID research design. The coefficient on each attribute variable represents the average marginal component effect or the average effect of the attribute on the probability that the candidate is chosen compared to the baseline neutral level for that attribute (Hainmueller et al., 2014).

These preliminary results show that the community leaders sampled have discernible preferences for the kinds of candidates they would like to work with, particularly with regards to corruption allegations of candidates. All else equal,



candidates without any form of corruption allegation are more likely to be preferred than those who face allegations of corruption. Those who have been cleared of corruption allegations are also preferred to those who have an ongoing case against them. Individual gifts from candidates to community leaders, while common practice in this part of the country, decreased the likelihood that a candidate was preferred in the match-up. There are a few possible interpretations for this result - either respondents were consistent in their preference for non-corrupt candidates and saw private goods as an extension of corruption, respondents were subject to social desirability bias, or a combination of both. The offer to finance projects in the neighborhood had a positive marginal effect on preference, but failed to reach standard levels of significance, as did support from other nearby CABs and a previous electoral victory. The attribute on income was also insignif-

icant.

Bradley-Terry models test the "abilities" of players in head-to-head match-ups and are commonly used in creating rankings for sports teams. Because estimates are based on choices among alternatives, Bradley-Terry models incorporate the underlying structure of alternatives in the data - choosing a means that b was not chosen. For an explanation of these models and their application to political science, see (Zucco et al., 2019). Since only 4 items were included in the paired comparison data, each subject was given 6 comparisons to decide on composing all of the possible combinations of the four items, and order both within pairs and between pairs was randomized. To analyze the data, I counted the number of times each attribute won in a match up against other attributes, creating a matrix with 24 rows (one row for each possible match up of comparisons). In the results table below, the ability estimates of the attributes are set in relation to neighborhood projects as the reference category. Each attribute (likelihood of winning, individual gifts, reputation for not being corrupt, and offers of neighborhood projects) with a negative coefficient means they were more likely to lose when compared with neighborhood projects, while positive coefficients represent that attribute being chosen over neighborhood projects. The results of these comparisons show that respondents preferred offers of neighborhood projects to any other candidate characteristic except for a reputation for not being corrupt, reflecting the community-development driven nature of communal action boards and a strong

dislike of corrupt candidates. Likelihood of winning was substantially lower in the rankings, and, similar to the conjoint results, an offer for individual benefits to the respondent was the least likely to be chosen compared to neighborhood projects.

Table 3.5: Pair-wise Comparison Results

	Ability Estimates
	Relative to a Neighborhood Project offer
Likely to win	-0.594^{***}
	(0.130)
Not Corrupt	0.045
	(0.123)
Individual Gift	-0.940^{***}
	(0.132)
Neighborhood Project	*NA*
Likely to win : Reelection	-0.082
	(0.202)
Not Corrupt : Reelection	-0.282
	(0.192)
Individual Gift : Reelection	-0.227
	(0.208)
Neighborhood Project : Reelection	*NA*
Constant	2.645^{***}
	(0.085)
Observations	24
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I fit the model with an interaction term to capture the effect of accountability (running for reelection vs. not running again) on the rankings. Each subject was coded as planning to run for reelection or not. A negative value on the interaction terms signals a decrease in ability when compared to the reference category of not running for reelection. While none of the interaction terms meet traditional measures of significance, the inclusion of the accountability interaction effects shows an interesting pattern that can be seen in the following preferences chart. The estimate for the importance of the non-corrupt characteristic drops when comparing subjects who do not plan to run for reelection and those who do. Individual gifts are even less desirable among those running for reelection. Conversely, the importance of neighborhood benefits increases. Relative to neighborhood benefits, the importance of partnering with a clean candidate remains higher than other categories but drops in importance for the subjects who face reelection. Both of these trends, while not significant, suggest that more accountable community leaders value community development, but perhaps at the cost of anti-corruption efforts. The overall number of subjects who we were able to contact by phone (n=63) is quite small for the expected effect size, so I am unable to draw a definitive conclusion from the data.

Table 3.6: Candidate Characteristic Rankings by Reelection Status

	No Interaction	Not Running for Reelection	Running for Reelection
1	Not Corrupt	Not Corrupt	Neighborhood Project
2	Neighborhood Project	Neighborhood Project	Not Corrupt
3	Likely to Win	Likely to Win	Likely to Win
4	Individual Gift	Individual Gift	Individual Gift

Similar to the conjoint, candidates offering individual gifts were least likely to be chosen in the pairwise comparison. In fact, only one respondent chose individual gifts over a neighborhood project, three chose individual gifts over not being corrupt, and three chose this attribute over having a likelihood of winning. There are three possible interpretations of this rejection for individual gifts - researcher-related social desirability bias, community-related social desirability, and a belief that individual gifts are less valuable. Respondents, knowing the enumerators were students at a local prestigious university and part of a research project being conducted by an American University may have provided answers they thought our research team would agree with. However, CAB leaders taking individual benefits from candidates is a widely disparaged practice in the community, not just among our research team. CAB leaders could be responding to this community perception by not taking part in these exchanges because they want to maintain their esteemed standing in the community. Individual gifts could also seem less valuable to CAB leaders because of their one-off nature. During interviews with CAB leaders that informed the research design, one leader told me that he never takes money from local politicians because then these politicians feel like they don't owe his community anything else in the future. Finally, this could be a product of selection effects. Rather than elections influencing candidate preferences, CAB leaders who decide to run for reelection could have underlying traits that are less altruistic and more willing to make deals with unsavory candidates to generate neighborhood improvement.

To adjudicate between these competing explanations, I repeated the analysis two more times with different interaction terms- membership rate and number of terms. During CAB elections, only officially registered members of the CAB can vote for leadership. While membership is open to everyone, in practice some neighborhoods have very few official members relative to the number of neighborhood residents.[8] About half of the CAB leaders interviewed claimed that at least half of the neighborhood were members, while the other half of respondents admitted that less than half of the neighborhood were members. In neighborhoods with relatively small members compared to the total population, individual gifts may be more preferable to non-excludable neighborhood projects because many residents whose votes do not count for leader reelection would get to use public goods at the same rate as voting community members. The interaction term is similarly insignificant, but in contrast with reelection status, the resulting preferences over candidate characteristics are identical between CAB leaders with high membership rates and those with low membership rates.

CAB leader preferences for public goods over private goods may also be the result of experience in office. Leaders who have greater experience may be more well-informed about the reputational and contractual risks of taking individual gifts like money from politicians. To approximate the variation in experience, I separate the responses between leaders who have only been CAB leaders for

[8]Respondents overwhelmingly blamed a lack of interest by residents for low membership rates in their communities.

one mayoral election period, and those who have been leaders for more than one mayoral election period. Similar to the results from interacting CAB membership rates, there were no discernible differences in preferences of CAB leaders with previous election experience and those without. Though none of the three models reach significant levels of confidence on interaction term coefficient estimates, both of these results suggest an underlying selection effect in running for reelection - neighborhood leaders that run for reelection are likely those that are willing to put project offers above other admirable candidate traits like a clean reputation.

3.8 Discussion and Conclusion

Due to difficulties with field research conditions during 2020, there are a number of challenges to extracting reliable results from this data. First, the small sample sizes on both the conjoint experiment and the pairwise comparison data mean the null results are not precise. The original research design involved collecting 250 responses from CAB leaders face-to-face in Santa Marta, which would have been close to the total number of leaders in the city. We were only able to collect a fraction of this number, and only from the most easily contacted respondents - those who attended Office of Community Affairs meetings and were willing to leave us their contact info, or who we could reach out to via snowball sampling. As such, the biased and small sample size means a second iteration of the study may likely yield very different results.

Second, the qualitative responses were likely influenced by my presence as a for-

eign researcher and the extraordinary lock-down conditions during the time of the study. The research assistants collecting these responses had spent their entire lives living in Santa Marta, but made clear that they were working on behalf of an American graduate student. I was introduced to many of these respondents through the office for communal affairs, which many associated with the current administration and the power to allocate grants for neighborhood improvements. The research assistants involved in this study were instructed to make sure leaders knew we were not able to provide any grants or assistance, but because the survey asked questions related to community issues, leaders thought we would pass their needs on to other people (foundations, city government, etc) who might help. Potential lingering misunderstandings also undoubtedly influenced decisions to share information with our research team. However, my role in the study likely biased away from finding variation in electoral mobilization effort as vote-buying is a socially undesirable activity and thus responses may have been framed in a more subtle way. The context of the pandemic also likely influenced answers such that future research may see different results even by contacting the same sample.

Despite these setbacks, the results indicate that local leaders prefer candidates offering public benefits for their communities rather than private incentives like cash handouts. Cash handouts generally lost the pairwise comparison match-ups, had a negative effect in the conjoint experiment, and were criticized frequently in the qualitative data. The data also supports, though not significantly, that

CAB leaders running for reelection are more permissive of undesirable candidate traits like corruption. Interview responses provided additional context and detail to explain that result. While the theory I put forth in this paper attributes broker behavior to the level of accountability they face, measured through upcoming re-election contests, analysis of the interview responses showed that leaders running for reelection were equally split as to whether they engaged in voter mobilization efforts. Those running for reelection or unsure about whether they would run almost entirely engaged in voter mobilization. Instead, the interviews point to a type of selection effect - both political and a-political types of leaders enter into office, but only political leaders opt to remain in these positions.

The results featured here raise new questions for further study. Elections may induce greater accountability for neighborhood-level leaders, but at the cost of encouraging them to work with potentially corrupt candidates for office. Future work can expand on this finding to see how neighborhood residents, who vote for their neighborhood leadership, evaluate and think about that trade-off. While personal preference likely plays a role, future work could explore whether structural features of neighborhoods prevent some neighborhood leaders from getting a good deal when trying to engage in broker work and thus lose interest in electoral politics. More generally, questions remain over why so many local leaders quit after just one term.

Another avenue for future study, specifically with communal action board leaders, is how neighborhood residents exert their influence over leadership. The original research design for this study involved a plan for detailed observation of neighborhood elections, but I was unable to do so because of pandemic-related election delays. Future work could interview voters and non-voters in those elections about their decision to participate, how they evaluated current leadership and any opposing candidates, and where they got their information on leader performance from. A careful examination of leader elections would provide greater detail about the variation in accountability that leaders face - far more than simply whether they were running for reelection or not. Finally, qualitative interview data revealed a far greater role for the private sector in funding local projects than I had expected to see. A study explicitly designed to uncover the role of private sector funding for community development could show an interesting dynamic where local businesses substitute for the work clientelistic politicians usually engage in, which may explain why some local leaders opted out of electoral politics.

CHAPTER IV

The Impact of Brokerage Density on Signaling Support at the Polls

4.1 Introduction

Because they lack grassroots-level engagement, politicians in a wide range of countries often contract with local brokers - people with connections and status in a community who promise to mobilize voters on behalf of politicians. Mobilizing voters through brokers can be an incredibly costly, but vital part of campaign strategy that comes with a substantial risk of moral hazard (Stokes et al., 2013; Larreguy et al., 2016; Camp, 2017). Local brokers' interests are not always aligned with the candidate's, and most countries employ a secret ballot, so brokers can collect payments for their work while expending minimal effort and resources mobilizing voters. Because of the risk of moral hazard, the ability for candidates to monitor the performance of brokers in the aggregate at polling stations is useful when campaigns decide how to allocate their resources to mobilization strategies, preferring to buy turnout in more easily-monitored parts of a district where the risks of moral hazard are lower (Rueda, 2017; Larreguy et al., 2016). When clientelism

and patronage influence the distribution of resources, uneven broker monitorability can generate spatial development disparities that affect local livelihoods and removes agency from communities in hard to monitor polling station areas. Despite monitorability's theoretical and practical importance in determining patterns of distributional politics, studies largely rely on only one potentially flawed measure of broker monitorability: polling station size. This paper addresses the field's under-specification of broker monitoring by expanding measures of electoral geography to include the distribution of polling stations *and* brokers across geographic space.

The geographical component of campaign strategy dictates how easy it is for candidates to infer a broker's effort based on aggregate polling station outcomes, but previous work largely measures monitorability by the size and number of polling stations (Rueda, 2017; Larreguy et al., 2016). Small polling stations allow brokers to monitor voters (Rueda, 2017) and political campaigns to monitor broker performance (Larreguy et al., 2016) because the aggregation is low enough that someone looking at the results can attribute small inconsistencies - for instance a candidate expecting to see 15 votes only gets 10- to broker effort rather than random noise. However we know that the distribution of brokers throughout a population varies substantially and that more dense concentrations of slum leaders resulted in substantial improvements in infrastructure through bottom up pressure for leaders to perform (Auerbach, 2016). Polling stations also vary in their concentration of bro-

kers with more homogeneous polling stations generating greater vote-share for the vote-buying incumbent party in Liberia (Bowles et al., 2020). This paper expands on the literature documenting the uneven spread of brokers across space to demonstrate that dense brokerage networks do not always prohibit political mobilization.

Studies that only consider polling station size are limited because electoral geography has two components: polling station distribution *and* broker distribution, both relative to the number of candidates on the ballot. The distribution of polling stations across districts is a proven element of monitoring and convenient to study in most scenarios because it is easily quantifiable and fits well with regression discontinuity designs due to the cut-offs frequently used in creating new polling stations within precincts. However, equating monitoring capacity with polling station size glosses over potential variation that can be just as important in determining the degree of moral hazard involved in contracting with local brokers. Imagine three polling stations each with 100 voters. In one of the polling stations, 50 of the voters decide for themselves who to vote for, and the other 50 are mobilized by one local broker to vote for a certain candidate. In the second polling station, 50 of the voters still decide for themselves who to vote for, and the other 50 are split among 5 brokers who mobilize 10 voters each for the same candidate. In the third polling station, 50 voters decide for themselves, 5 brokers mobilize ten voters each for different candidates. When results are tallied on election day, attributing the final vote count to the broker responsible for it is much easier in the first case

than the second, despite having the same number of voters in each polling station because any vote count below 50 can be attributed to one broker's failure. The third case is easier to ascertain than the second because candidates still see small aggregate numbers. While polling station size changes monitorability on the margins and thus is ideal for causally testing the impact of monitorability on campaign behavior, size alone is too coarse to use as a reliable measurement in other contexts. Rather, by considering distribution of brokers per polling station in concert with variation on polling station geography and candidates on the ballot, we can uncover new insights into the effect of brokerage and polling station spatial density on voter mobilization efforts by campaigns.

Colombia's electoral system and formalized structure of neighborhood associations make the ideal case to demonstrate the importance of uneven broker geography in determining the clarity of broker effort in aggregate polling station results on election day. Colombia has a weak party system and open-list proportional electoral rules so it's common that a large number of different candidates for the legislature or city council receive votes at the same polling station, and very few candidates have a sufficient nation-wide presence to win votes at most polling stations. Even voters from the same ideological background face hundreds of potential senate candidates for whom they can cast their vote, giving out-sized importance to local vote mobilizers who can coordinate the votes from one neighborhood around a single candidate. When nationally unpopular candidates win substantial numbers of

votes at only a few polling places, it's likely that local brokers mobilized supporters to vote for that candidate. In Colombia, governance collectives called *Juntas de Acción Comunal*, CABs or Communal Action Boards (CAB) in English, work as both communal leaders and neighborhood brokers. Every neighborhood can have a CAB, and the local government keeps a record of all CABs in the municipality, as well as their self-defined borders. CABs are the ideal case to illuminate and test this theory because they are formalized and geographic-based, which means local municipal offices keep maps that show the distribution of CABs across municipalities. Despite official regulations forbidding CAB leaders from engaging in electoral politics, local CAB leaders actively turn out votes for candidates in their "personal capacity" and, as one campaign operative put it, are "indispensable" in mobilizing voters.[1]

I create an original measure of polling station mobilization monitorability using the spatial geography of polling station and CAB leadership offices across Bogotá. Because polling stations vary in their distribution across the city, and neighborhood CABs vary in size, brokers working out of specific neighborhoods face varying levels of monitorability at the polling station level. To capture this variation I combine spatial information on each polling station's neighborhood composition with GIS coordinates for CAB meeting rooms and membership rosters in Colombia's capital. I use the number of CABs to approximate for the number of brokers working in a polling station vicinity, a number that likely under-counts the true

[1]Field Notes, October 2019

number of brokers in a community. High density polling stations are both large and small with little relation between density and size. Using data on vote choice at the polling station level, I test the relationship between the number of brokers assigned to a polling place and the distribution of the vote across candidates at that polling place.

I find that the density of brokers to polling places has an effect on both the number and type of candidates winning votes at each polling station. Adding two additional brokers per polling place adds the equivalent of 1 additional candidate actively competing at the polling place, and decreases the vote share of party leaders compared to lower-listed party candidates by 1%. The results are robust to alternative specifications and potentially under-count the true effect size. While the measurement strategy only accounts for one type of formally registered communal organization, there are likely a greater number of brokers working out of the vicinity of a single polling station through other forms of collective organizing. In contrast with previous literature that expects brokers facing competition within communities to shirk due to monitoring problems, I show that less monitorable districts have greater diversity in the candidates receiving votes and are areas where candidates with high name recognition get less votes. This result suggests that brokers respond to competition from other brokers not by shirking, but possibly by diversifying themselves from other brokers to lessen monitoring problems while still mobilizing large numbers of voters. Qualitative interviews from communal

action board leaders in Colombia support this inference.

While I use the case of Colombia to test the theory, the importance of accounting for uneven density of brokerage over space applies to other cases where vote buying occurs through geographically constrained brokers. Not all brokers represent geographic communities of voters, and not all community leaders engage in political patronage work. In cases where brokers more commonly represent trade groups, businesses, religious associations, or disparate ethnic groups, monitoring brokers at the aggregate level using polling station vote tallies is more challenging, regardless of the size of polling stations or density of brokerage networks. The measurement strategy for broker effort also relies on Colombia's open list proportional electoral system that allows me to distinguish the degree of mobilization by comparing vote shares for party leaders with high name recognition with more obscure candidates. In a two-party system with less intra-party competition, however, broker density affects monitorability concerns to an even greater extent because polling stations with more than two brokers mean that multiple brokers are mobilizing for the same candidate such that aggregate results are not attributable to a specific broker.

This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, I present a novel way of thinking about broker monitorability. Previous studies emphasized the size of polling stations, which is an appealing approach because researchers can easily quantify it and marginal changes in size do have an effect on monitorability, all

other things equal. But polling station size is a limited notion of monitorability because it leaves out the number of brokers mobilizing voters in a polling station, which is largely independent of size and is ill-suited for explaining broker and candidate behavior in a multiparty open-list electoral system. In contrast, I present a new measure of broker monitorability by quantifying the number of unique brokers working in a polling station compared to the number of candidates on the ballot. This measurement combined with open-list proportional electoral rules raises the possibility that politicians can successfully monitor turnout in larger polling stations, and might be unable to monitor turnout in small polling stations, contrary to expectations from existing theories.

Second, I expand on previous work by Adam Auerbach and Bowles et al. who show that the uneven distribution of political brokers through space affects patterns of political mobilization in the developing world. Neighborhoods where more than one broker mobilizes votes have higher levels of development because brokers have to work hard to keep their vote base from defecting to other brokers (Auerbach, 2016). Polling stations with larger numbers of brokers in contrast have lower rates of voter mobilization in Liberia because political campaigns find it difficult to monitor broker performance which increases risks of moral hazard (Bowles et al., 2020). My work builds on these advances by examining the impact of spatially uneven brokerage networks on the relationship between brokers and the politicians that they contract with. We might expect brokers to be highly motivated to de-

velop a secure voter base in neighborhoods with many other competing brokers, but, as previous work suggests, politicians may be unwilling to spend large sums in neighborhoods where they cannot track individual broker performance.

Third, this paper raises new questions about how brokers and candidates can respond to monitoring problems associated with poor electoral geography. While the placement and size of polling stations is largely out of the control of candidates and brokers,[2] brokers can respond to an oversupply of brokers in a polling place by diversifying the candidates they work with. When a collective of neighborhood brokers negotiate the exchange of resources for mobilization work, they might be able to negotiate higher value returns like public goods, but the moral hazard risks associated with multiple brokers mobilizing for the same candidate at one polling station create barriers to collective action. Huge numbers of voters live in areas with larger than average polling stations and dense broker networks, so understanding how those communities can collectively exchange support for patronage goods in less than ideal monitoring conditions is key to understanding patronage-based resource distribution.

[2]One leader I interviewed during my fieldwork did suggest that she pushed for a polling station in her neighborhood in order to improve their neighborhood's political visibility, but this is fairly unusual.

4.2 Neighborhood Leaders as Brokers

Leaders of local organizations are often co-opted into clientelist brokerage positions where they leverage their community knowledge and influence to gather votes for political parties in exchange for positions of greater prestige or stability in the municipal government, rents from local development projects, or simply better public services for their communities (Novaes, 2018; Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Paller, 2014; Baldwin, 2013; Koter, 2013). Brokers traditionally play an intermediary role between politicians and voters through recruiting voters to turn out in support of politicians in exchange for individual or collective goods ranging from cash handouts to diverted local development spending. Existing theories of broker behavior focus on the role they play in connecting voters to candidates by collecting information about voters, making strategic distribution choices, and monitoring voter behavior (Stokes et al., 2013) and are crucial to a party's mobilization strategy because weak and new parties lack direct linkages to voters (Bowles et al., 2020).

The term "broker" encompasses all manner of individuals who connect voters with candidates. Clientelistic brokers mobilize voters on behalf of candidates or parties in return for personal or collective rewards. Individual brokers can remain loyal to a party or act as independent agents who can continually renegotiate mobilization contracts with different parties and politicians from year to year (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). Some brokers are embedded in organizations like unions

or religious leaders, while others develop a following without relying on organizational structure (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). Other brokers are part of public administration, and so performing their daily work while framing their actions as personal favors can greatly increase their capacity to mobilize supporters (Oliveros, 2016). Geographically based brokers who represent a specific area, neighborhood, or village are the most likely to see their votes concentrated at one polling place rather than brokers working in organizations that are spread across the city, but all clientelistic brokers must come up with ways to display the size of their voting bloc in order to negotiate mobilization contracts with candidates.

The relationship between clientelistic brokers and the politicians that hire them suffers from a moral hazard problem - brokers are hired because they are believed to have better information about local voters, but are likely to both overstate the number of voters they can mobilize and the value of their labor in mobilization because parties have insufficient information to monitor the broker's actions. A broker's value in negotiations with politicians is based on the number of followers they can credibly claim to have influence over (Camp, 2017; Auerbach, 2016; Paller, 2014), muddled by politician's poor information about the proclivity of these voters to support a candidate in the absence of broker effort (Stokes et al., 2013). Politicians value brokers that can *reliably* turn out high numbers of voters who would not otherwise cast their ballots in support of the party, but often are unable to monitor whether a broker has actually fulfilled his or her vote quota, so

brokers can over promise turnout while shirking in their mobilization efforts. One way to overcome this problem is through bonuses if the party or candidate wins (Stokes, 2005; Camp et al., 2014), but this is often insufficient because brokers gain their own private utility from shirking by building a bloc of core voters rather than the intended swing voters (Camp, 2017). Another way that politicians overcome moral hazard risks with hiring brokers is through contracting with brokers who have direct upward ties to party elites, rather than those who have more information about voters (Brierley and Nathan, 2019), which suggests that concerns about moral hazard are more prominent than concerns over mobilization effectiveness.

Electoral geography can shift the ability of politicians to monitor broker performance which affects broker-politician accountability. Politicians commonly use polling station or precinct-level data on turnout and vote-choice to infer the contributions of individual brokers, but the signal generated from unit-level totals decreases in precision as the size of the polling station increases (Rueda, 2017; Larreguy et al., 2016). Turnout is higher in smaller Mexican polling places, and the turnout increase is associated with increasing vote-share for the PRI, likely attributable to their prominent party machinery. Because smaller polling places send a clearer signal of broker effort, broker's exert more effort to comply with their turnout commitments (Larreguy et al., 2016). As a result, political parties deploy more resources in areas where those brokers can be monitored.

Other literature challenges this notion that brokers are deployed strategically to certain areas and instead demonstrates the distributive impact of uneven distribution of brokers throughout space. When multiple brokers from the same party are working within one neighborhood, Auerbach finds that the competition between brokers from the same party creates a form of accountability that drives positive development outcomes for the neighborhood (2016). Conversely, when slums have only one party worker per neighborhood and therefore no competition, or party workers from opposing parties, slums tend to have lower levels of development. The density of broker networks across physical space is key to understanding patronage politics in India's slums.

The uneven distribution of brokers across polling stations affects electoral mobilization as well. When polling places in Liberia are largely composed of voters from the same village, and presumably the same broker, vote tallies at these homogeneous polling station are more easily attributed to broker effort. In comparison, where polling stations have voters from multiple villages, campaigns face a challenge in attributing vote tallies to the brokers who mobilized each village. More homogeneous polling stations show a greater vote-share for the incumbent party in Liberia, thought to be the only party with the resources to use hierarchical brokerage networks to mobilize voters (Bowles et al., 2020).

Recent advances in understanding how candidates monitor broker performance

have considered both the size of the polling place and the make-up of voters, but the concept that large or heterogeneous polling places are inherently less monitorable isn't applicable in systems where more than one party or one candidate can use patronage to reward vote mobilizers.

4.3 Theory

The clarity with which politicians can attribute votes at polling places to individual brokers remains an important variable in the relationship between politicians and brokers. While previous work operationalizes monitoring capacity as the number of registered voters in a polling place, I present an alternative measure for the concept and caution against using polling station size alone as an indicator of monitorability. Inferences about broker performance from polling stations require an understanding of how many brokers are mobilizing voters in that space relative to the number of candidates winning votes, a number that is not evenly distributed across polling stations and not necessarily correlated with polling station size.

The distribution of a candidate's brokers across polling places affects the clarity of polling station level results as an indicator of mobilization effectiveness. Imagine a candidate for Senate contracted with 15 different neighborhood brokers in a city. If those brokers all worked in different neighborhoods that voted in separate unique polling places, the candidate's campaign team could easily attribute under-performance at a polling station to one specific broker. By contrast, if all 15 brokers work out of the same polling place and one broker decides to not mobilize

any voters, it's nearly impossible for the candidate to attribute those missing votes to a specific broker.

The number of candidates on the ballot creates a threshold for monitoring challenges because lower numbers of candidates increase the likelihood that two or more brokers at one polling place are working with the same candidate. The more brokers working for the same candidate at the same polling place, the more difficult it is to attribute blame for poor performance. In an election where only two serious contenders are on the ballot, the number of brokers exceeding the number of candidates is oftentimes related to the size of the polling place, which means that polling station size is a good indicator of broker monitorability. When only one party can afford to mobilize voters, as is common in new democracies, the threshold is even lower. The greater the number of vote-buying candidates, the less important the size of the polling place is to broker monitorability as long as candidates only contract with one broker per polling place.

The table below summarizes the argument for any number of brokers and candidates competing at the polling station. The columns represent the number of candidates expecting to win votes through contracts with brokers at the polling place, and the rows represent the number of brokers mobilizing voters at the polling place. No matter the number of candidates, when only one broker is mobilizing voters at a polling place, polling station level results accurately depict their effort,

plus some unknown but constant error (for instance, confused voters casting ballots mistakenly for a different candidate). Any shirking by the broker will be easily attributable to her when results are tallied. This is reflected in the table with zeros across row one, meaning that there is minimal risk of moral hazard. When only one candidate is mobilizing voters through brokerage networks at the polling place, as was true in Liberia where Bowles et al. set their study, the greater the number of brokers, the larger the degree of moral hazard involved in the contract between broker and candidate. Looking down column 1 of the table, the degree of moral hazard increases from 0 to one less than the number of brokers. Similarly, in a context where only two of the parties engage in voter mobilization through vote-buying polling stations where there are more than two brokers suffer from an increasingly large degree of moral hazard as the number of brokers increases. This expectation holds only if brokers work for different candidates.

		Number of Candidates					
		1	2	3	4	5	N
Number of Brokers	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	1	0*	0*	0*	0*	0*
	3	2	1	0*	0*	0*	0*
	4	3	2	1	0*	0*	0*
	5	4	3	2	1	0*	0*
	N	N-1	N-2	N-3	N-4	N-5	0*

Table 4.1: Degree of Moral Hazard by Number of Candidates and Number of Brokers
*indicates condition if candidates only work with one broker per polling place

In contrast with previous literature based on two-party elections, an electoral system where large numbers of candidates are on the ballot could see greater effort from brokers working in large, crowded polling stations rather than less. In polling stations where many brokers are mobilizing voters, candidates can still closely monitor broker performance so long as a candidate only works with one broker in the polling place, which should limit shirking on behalf of brokers. When candidates can only choose one partner among a large number of brokers at one polling place, competition between brokers combined with effective monitoring should generate higher levels of mobilization overall.

Considering the density of brokers within polling places leads to observable implications for the level of moral hazard in broker-candidate contracts. When comparing polling stations of similar sizes for multi-seat elections, the polling stations that serve a larger number of neighborhood brokers should see a greater diversity in the candidates winning votes there, particularly among those candidates most likely to use brokers to mobilize voters. Polling stations with more brokers should see greater diversity in candidates winning votes because candidates are unlikely to work with multiple brokers in the same polling place. Rather than shirking, brokers in dense polling stations should be motivated to engage in voter mobilization campaigns for "clientelist" candidates or those that need to work with local brokers to connect with voters. When only two candidates are on the ballot, polling stations with larger numbers of surrounding neighborhoods should see lower over-

all voter mobilization effort either because candidates avoid striking contracts in those areas or because brokers respond to poor monitoring conditions by underperforming regardless of the size of the polling place. Polling stations where large number of brokers are mobilizing voters are not necessarily large polling stations.

4.4 Geographically-Concentrated Neighborhood Association Leaders are Colombia's Political Brokers

Communal Action Boards, or CABs, play a key brokerage role in many Colombian communities. Because Colombia has a weak party system and conducts nationwide elections using open-list proportional representation, many voters turn to community leaders to identify who they should support. Sometimes this is in the form of a direct exchange of votes for goods and services individually, but other times in exchange for more collective benefits. Some voters simply need guidance on policy positions of candidates. CAB leaders who are hoping to generate neighborhood level improvements, cash they can hand out to individuals, or local prestige that they can use for policy influence all require a clear way of demonstrating the amount of votes they can mobilize.

While every group of 70 people or more can form a CAB in their neighborhood, CABs tend to be the most active in lower-income and informal neighborhoods where the need for self-governance and government intervention is the most acute. Wealthier neighborhoods often substitute CABs with condo associations or other

forms of collective organizing, and while these groups can be quite active in raising funds for local improvements, they are far less likely to engage in electoral politics. CABs also range in size, from the minimum 70 members to representing thousands of households over wide swathes of territory. The average communal action board in Bogotá has 200 members. Neighborhoods in Colombia are a strong source of identity for residents, which larger communal action boards leverage to prevent entrepreneurial broker-hopefuls from seceding to form a new neighborhood. Squatter settlements in particular are likely to form communal action boards as their first act in gaining formal land tenure, and in Colombia these settlements are common in the hills surrounding more wealthy neighborhoods. Because of this trend, it's not uncommon to see one political action board that occupies a small amount of territory surrounded by wealthier neighborhoods that lack boards. The density of brokerage networks across space in Bogotá is immensely varied because of local patterns in wealth and neighborhood size.

While communal action board presidents often have day-jobs, the most lucrative part of their unpaid position as neighborhood leader is political brokerage. In addition to direct monetary benefits of working as a broker, CAB presidents often point to their political relationships as one of the few opportunities they have to make good on their personal campaign promises of community development. For example, Rodolfo, the president of an informal peripheral neighborhood in Santa Marta, described his political brokerage negotiation to me as a process of creating

indebtedness. Taking money or gifts from politicians before an election removes any leverage he might have when politicians are in office, so the timing of his requests and the amount he can negotiate for is related to the power of a politician in office versus as a candidate outside of office. Political candidates for municipal office can offer him a better deal for his neighborhood after they become members of the city council if he waits to cash in his reward, although there is some degree of uncertainty around whether they might win and whether the politician will follow through on the agreement once in office. Senate candidates, in contrast, have much less direct input in municipal affairs, greater uncertainty about their election, and substantial resources outside of government, so upfront payment is preferable.[3]

CAB leaders in Colombia also follow different strategies when working with political candidates depending on the type of election. Following local elections in October of 2019, I visited Luis, the leader of a communal action board in a peripheral urban neighborhood who was celebrating with a city councilman that he had helped elect and two members of the councilman's campaign staff. Luis boasted that every candidate he worked with was successfully elected to public office in the election, but when I challenged his assertion by pointing out that his candidate for governor and mayor lost in a landslide, he claimed elections for those positions don't count. He had never formed a relationship with the campaigns for those candidates, despite having their names painted in 12 inch font across the front of his house. He commented that, "when choosing the mayor, people mobilize them-

[3]Field notes: March 2019

selves, but for state assembly and city council, one mobilizes by bringing vehicles, transport and everything to turn the community out."[4] Many neighborhood association leaders I spoke with pointed to national and local legislature elections, rather mayoral and governor seats as the area where they can negotiate the largest levels of support.[5] The theory in this paper suggests that the poor ability for mayoral campaigns to identify and attribute votes to specific brokers led to a limited role for neighborhood-based brokers role in their campaigns because the elections were single-seat, meaning only a few candidates ran. Multi-seat elections using proportional representation, like those for Senate in Colombia, would be easier to monitor.

Some CAB leaders do actively mobilize for single-seat elections, but follow a different strategy. Like Luis, Diana is the leader of a peripheral invasion neighborhood under the process of formalizing titles to the land they occupied. When I met her, she was a public sector employee at the city level and an active member of the incumbent mayor's growing political party. Like Luis, she had large banners hanging in front of her house with the names of candidates for governor and mayor, including life-size cut-outs, but unlike Luis she credits her work with the Mayor and Governor as key to her community's recent development improvement including legalization and a water cistern. She had successfully lobbied to add a polling station to a nearby neighborhood, and regularly met with four of the six other

[4]Interview 8820
[5]Field notes: October 2019

neighborhood leaders who would use that polling place, all of whom supported the same slate of candidates in exchange for club goods for the neighborhood.[6] Her long-running relationship with the mayor's political party in the area meant she was a trusted broker for the mayor's campaign and would have helped them to overcome disadvantages associated with contracts over single-seat elections. She works closely with the three other CAB presidents surrounding the polling station in support of the same mayoral candidate's team, but when I interviewed one of the other leaders working with her, Rosa, she lamented their inability to act collectively to support city council candidates. Rosa explained that for mayoral and governor candidates, the group of CAB presidents were able to keep a list of the exact table in the polling place that people in their community who had committed to vote for the governor and mayor were registered to vote at. For city councilors and assembly-persons, however, "they were really divided," Rosa claimed, "because lots of candidates run for city council, so what happens? People were motivated by their personal interests and we became divided."[7] In many other communities, neighboring community leaders may want to coordinate their support for certain candidates in return for higher rewards, but campaigns are unable to differentiate effort at polling stations or easily disaggregate rewards to those who complied with the contract, and therefore appear to have an incentive to shirk.

Colombia has a weak party system due to decentralization reforms in the 1990's

[6]Field notes: October 2019
[7]Interview 4829

and the open list version of proportional representation used to seat the legislature. Lower house seats are apportioned by departments (Colombia's sub-national unit) that then use open list proportional representation to fill the apportioned seats, but upper-house Senate candidates compete nationwide. Legislative candidates frequently campaign for their own number on the list rather than the party as a whole, and party labels are largely devoid of meaning due to frequent movement realignment where parties team up in sometimes conflicting pairings to yield a complete list of candidates. Because lower-ranked candidates on the party list cannot personally rely on national political party infrastructure to generate votes, they must form connections with voters themselves. CAB leaders working as brokers facilitate this for senate candidates. Since Senators depend on grassroots actors for their votes, they often cannot mount national campaigns and instead focus their efforts in select regions and municipalities. Some candidates have national name recognition, like former Colombian president Álvaro Uribe, or sit at the top of the party ticket, so they rely less on brokers and receive votes nation-wide. The geographically uneven nature of votes for senate candidates can be seen in polling station level results which form the basis of my research design.

4.5 Research Design

The city of Bogotá has 642 polling places[8] that serve 5.5 million eligible voters or around 16% of the country's overall electoral census making it a major player in national electoral campaigns. Only 36% of eligible Bogotanos turn out to vote in

[8]This number include the jails and Colombians voting in consulates abroad

legislative elections (Misión de Observación Electoral, 2018) so turnout is key to any electoral strategy. The largest polling place in the city had over 25,000 votes in the Senate election[9] and the smallest polling place recorded 71 votes. In addition to the uneven distribution of voters to polling stations, there is also immensely uneven distribution of communal action boards within polling station areas. I use spatial coordinates of both polling stations and the city's 814 *Salones Comunales* or Communal Action board meeting rooms combined with vote tallies for each of the 2018 candidates for Senate to measure the variation in brokerage network density and voter mobilization across the city's polling places.

By comparing the spatial distribution of meeting rooms to polling stations, I can approximate the number of brokers mobilizing voters per polling station. For each polling place, I create a Voronoi tessellation such that every point within the polygon is closest to that polling station, and every point outside the polygon is closest to other polling stations. The complete tessellation approximates, though imperfectly, voter assignment to polling stations. Using the tessellations, I counted the number of communal action board meeting rooms per polling station area. Figure 4.1 depicts the map of polling place Voronoi tessellations across the urban center of Bogotá and the density of communal action boards per polling place.

[9]This number excludes the electoral census post where residents who were not otherwise assigned a polling place can come to vote. 53,474 votes were cast for the 2018 senate election at that polling place.



Figure 4.1: Density of Communal Action Boards by Polling Station Vicinity

I use results from the 2018 Senate race in Bogotá. Senate seats are filled through open-list proportional representation from a nation-wide contest, meaning Senate candidates can get the votes they need to secure a seat in the Senate from just a handful of polling places anywhere in the entire country. In this particular election, the most popular party running received just over 16% of the vote while multiple smaller parties won between 3 and 8%. In this particular Senate election, the lowest number of votes needed to win a Senate seat was just over 14,000[10], while the average seated Senator received around 94,000 votes.

I measure the number of unique candidates winning votes at a particular polling station by using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of candidate shares of the votes cast at the polling place. The HHI can calculate the number of candidates who won votes at the polling station, weighted by the size of their vote shares.

[10]This number does not include the reserved seats for indigenous peoples and the FARC

The inverse of this number yields the effective number of candidates winning votes at that polling place. If three candidates received the great majority of the votes cast, but hundreds of candidates received just one or two votes, the competitiveness index would indicate that there were really only three candidates competing at the polling place, which is less competitive than polling stations where the vote share is more evenly shared across a larger number of candidates. I expect that polling places surrounded by a greater number of communal action boards should have higher voter mobilization among disparate candidates, and thus appear more competitive as measured by the inverse of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.

Second, I measure the percentage of votes at a polling place going to party leaders. Party leaders in Colombia have higher name recognition than candidates featured lower on the list, and are most likely to win a seat in Senate due to their position as the first party member on the party list. Votes only for the party go toward their vote totals. Therefore, these candidates are the least likely to need connections with individual voters through neighborhood brokers in comparison with candidates farther down the party list. To calculate the percentages at each polling place, I counted the number of votes cast for the leaders of the Green Alliance Party, Center Democratic Party, List of Decency Coalition, Radical Change Party, Conservative Party of Colombia, Liberal Party of Colombia, MIRA Political Party, Alternative Democratic Pole Party, and Social Party of National Unity (de la U), divided by the total number of votes cast at that polling place. I expect

that polling places with more dense broker networks will have lower vote shares for party leaders relative to others on the ballot, reflecting roust mobilization efforts by neighborhood brokers.

Because active communal boards are correlated with wealth, I control for the economic strata of each polling place's surrounding area using block-level data on public service subsidy levels across the city (one being the most subsidized and five being the least subsidized). To calculate the average economic strata level of the areas surrounding each polling station, I weight the economic strata number by the percentage of area covered and take the average. To control for the size of the polling place, I include data on the total number of ballot boxes at the polling place which proxies for polling station size while not being directly correlated with the degree of voter mobilization.

4.6 Results

The distribution of communal action boards across polling stations is fairly evenly split. About one-third of the polling places in Bogotá have no communal action boards nearby. Another third only have one, and the final third have two or more communal action boards. The polling place with the greatest number of communal action boards has seven, while just over one hundred polling places have only two CABs.

Figure 4.2: Competition and Vote Share by Density of Communal Action Boards



Figure 4.3: Comparison between polling places with zero, one, and multiple CABs in the vicinity

The results of the linear models are shown in Table 4.2. The Number of CABs in the vicinity of the polling place is positively correlated with the effective number of candidates winning votes at the polling place, and negatively associated with party leader vote share at the polling place. Models 1 and 2 use values that have been calculated after dropping annulled, blank, or not marked ballots. In other words, this model calculates the effective number of candidates and the vote share of party leaders using just valid votes. Dropping these votes from the vote totals reduces the noise from voting that is likely not due to mobilization. Models 3 and 4 do the same but also drop votes cast for parties rather than individual candidates. Dropping these voters captures just the effect of broker density on the valid votes cast for individual candidates.[11] In all of these models, one additional CAB in the

[11]Polling stations with high percentages of invalid or blank ballot and voting just for a party rather than a candidate are positively correlated in the sample and correlated with a number of alternative factors like wealth and interest in politics.

vicinity of the polling station is related to an increase in the number of candidates winning votes and lower vote shares for party leaders at that polling place.

While the overall effect size is small, the direction of the effect suggests that multiple brokers in the vicinity of the polling place does not in fact reduce broker effort in mobilizing voters. Voters choose to vote for a greater number of candidates in these polling stations, and are more likely to choose down-list candidates rather than party leaders. These two results taken together suggest that polling places with larger numbers of communal action boards have more active voter mobilization efforts across a broader array of candidates. These results are not likely due to latent ideological effects since party-leaders represent front-runners across the ideological spectrum, ranging from the Green Party to the rightist Center Democratic party.

Both dependent variables have immense variation among the polling places that did not have any communal action boards in the vicinity, but are robust to excluding those polling places. Some polling places lack CABs because they are largely wealthy and these wealthy polling station areas also have less blank and annulled votes, as well as less party-line votes. Wealthy areas tend to have more votes for the five most popular candidates nation-wide and an emphasis only on popular candidates might lower the competitiveness of the polling place. Similarly, wealthy areas are less likely to see blank, annulled, or unmarked ballots, which could af-

Table 4.2: Results

	Model Type:			
	Valid Votes		Valid Votes for Candidates	
	Eff. # of Candidates	*Party Leader Vote Share*	*Eff. # of Candidates*	*Party Leader Vote Share*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
# of CABs	0.394**	−0.456***	0.383**	−0.472***
	(0.186)	(0.134)	(0.194)	(0.162)
Wealth (Strata)	−7.462***	7.367***	−7.718***	7.719***
	(0.260)	(0.188)	(0.272)	(0.226)
Number of Tables	0.027**	0.034***	0.028**	0.053***
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Constant	46.253***	8.222***	42.231***	15.531***
	(0.875)	(0.631)	(0.914)	(0.762)
n	626	626	626	626
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

fect the results in the models where those types of ballots are included. Wealth is negatively correlated with polling place competitiveness (measured through the effective number of candidates) and positively correlated with party-leader vote share, but the effect of CAB density is robust to the inclusion of controls for wealth.

Another potential explanation for the large variation among communities with no nearby boards is that other more informal brokers are mobilizing voters at some of these polling places. My current measurement strategy using communal action board meeting rooms in some ways under-counts the number of active brokers. In neighborhoods without formal boards, there still may be alternative forms of hierarchical community organizing that are well-suited to brokerage arrangements including apartment and condo associations, religious groups, parent organizations, sports teams, and more. For example, some of the polling places with no nearby communal action boards were very close to subsidized public housing projects, which have community governance boards that are not listed as official communal action boards. If multiple of these groups are organizing voters in the vicinity of the polling place, we might expect similar results as if there were multiple communal action boards organizing voters.

Both effects are robust to alternative specifications, including dropping certain controls as well as dropping polling places that did not have any communal action boards. Across all specifications, polling places with many communal action

boards in the vicinity had more mobilization across candidates and lower vote shares by party leaders, suggesting that brokers effort is not negatively affected by broker density.

4.7 Conclusion

In addition to their work on advocacy and governance, local leaders often simultaneously perform the work of electoral brokers by buying and selling their neighborhood's votes. Brokers make vote-buying commitments to candidates for public office in return for individual handouts like cash or collective public goods like the promise of a paved road. Electoral geography - the distribution of communities across polling places affects the level of accountability that local neighborhood leaders face in their brokerage work because politicians can more easily attribute vote tallies to some neighborhoods compared to others. Data featured in this paper demonstrates large variation in the density of brokerage networks across the city of Bogotá and it's relation to voter mobilization efforts. I find that polling places with denser brokerage networks have greater divergence in the number of candidates receiving votes at the polling place, and that party leaders have lower vote shares in polling places with more dense broker networks. Taken together, these results support the theory that brokers in multiparty elections tend to work for different candidates rather than mobilize for the same candidates, and are motivated to turn out voters for brokerage-dependent candidates. Results are robust to multiple alternative specifications.

The results of this paper raise a number of new questions on the role of geographically-based brokers in political campaigns. First, polling station level results are likely not the only way for brokers to signal effort, and more in-depth qualitative research can shed light on alternative pathways for brokers and candidates to overcome the information problem. Entrepreneurial brokers can use other tactics, including setting up motorcycle brigades, checking in voters at multiple posts simultaneously using google sheets, publicly committing to candidates by painting their names on their house, and, for some neighborhood brokers, even unsuccessfully running for office themselves one year to demonstrate how many votes they have influence over. We should think more critically about whether candidates consider these challenges to monitorability at the polling place level or just partner with trustworthy family or business partners.

A second avenue for future research concerns the ability for brokers to work together for the same candidate. Multiple brokers working for the same candidate in one polling place exacerbates information and collective action problems both between brokers and the candidates they work with. Candidates can't attribute effort to one broker or another, which increases the opportunity for brokers to minimize their own individual effort. Brokers working on the same team also may get some reward whether they put in effort or not, furthering disincentives to mobilize voters. However candidates for office often promise non-excludable club goods for

specific areas like wells, playgrounds, and paved roads. I also found in my fieldwork some brokers who did seem to work together on electoral campaigns, despite working at the same polling place as their team. More difficult to measure concepts like kinship and networks of trust may play a key role in these collective acts.

Examining the role of broker density in two-party systems may also yield new insights. In two-party systems, brokers should similarly be unlikely to work together in support of the same candidates because monitoring problems are exacerbated when only two candidates are on the ballot. In response, brokers with small voter sizes may be excluded from campaigns because candidates can only reliably work with one candidate per polling place. Future work could explore whether single-member districts or other forms of majoritarian electoral systems could push out smaller brokers in the same way that majoritarian systems tend to disfavor small parties.

Finally, geographic brokerage networks in Colombia co-exist with organizational networks like unions and religious groups. Whether membership in a brokerage network is defined by long-standing identities like kinship (Cruz et al., 2017), or more mutable identities like organization (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015) and public employment connections (Oliveros, 2016), some forms of brokerage depend are identifiable over geographic space and others are not. Previous research on monitoring broker behavior has largely relied on brokers sending voters to a spe-

cific polling place, but my research uncovered neighborhood communities with voters who fanned out across the municipality to cast their ballot, usually with transportation help from their neighborhood leader. Brokerage that lacks geographic boundaries accounts for much of the political mobilization in many parts of the world, so understanding how those groups overcome monitoring problems is an area ripe for future research.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion and Areas for Future Work

5.1 Summary

My dissertation explores the intersect of political and governance roles that grassroots leaders play in Colombian neighborhoods and how tensions between these responsibilities affect connections with the state and politics at the *barrio* level. I draw on extensive qualitative interviews and participant observation in combination with administrative data and survey data I collect in the field and to answer questions related to effective grassroots governance. I explore the wealth of data I have collected over the course of 16 months in the field and make a unique contribution not only to the social science discipline but also to multidisciplinary studies of urban life in Latin America.

5.2 Multidisciplinary Appeal

This work has wide multi-disciplinary appeal in the fields of development, and studies of the Latin American urban experience, while also employing cross-disciplinary methods that speak to several different traditions of inquiry.

Community-driven development programs are immensely popular in the aid community and increasingly pushed for by international donors, but these institutions often suffer from forms of elite capture that prevents needed benefits from reaching the intended clients. My dissertation directly speaks to this problem by carefully documenting the multiple layers of responsibilities and incentives that grassroots leaders face in order to account for potential tension between local leaders and organizational partners. This work will make an impact in several fields as grassroots leaders are crucial partners in public health campaigns, micro-credit initiatives, and transitional justice, among others.

Neighborhoods are a core part of people's identity in Latin America, so aggregating to voting precincts or localities smooths over important variation that drastically impacts the quality of life in neighboring communities. Through field work and labor-intensive data collection, my dissertation presents an analysis of the impact grassroots leaders have on development, legitimacy, and democracy at the neighborhood level and in doing so helps us better understand the human experience in cities across Latin American and other parts of the globe.

Finally, this dissertation overcomes the challenges related to analysis at a sub-municipal level by leveraging cross-disciplinary methods of inquiry ranging from participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and quantitative experimental methods. The centerpiece of my dissertation is a collection of interviews with 150 communal action board presidents and a typology to interpret the behavioral constraints that they face. This research is one of only a handful of studies that

collects data at this depth and scale through open-ended interviews with this type of community actor.

5.3 Areas for Future Work

Communal action boards and other institutions like them present enormous opportunity for future research. Notably absent throughout the dissertation is a systematic effort to document and explore the attitudes and opinions of local residents rather than just leaders themselves. Each chapter in this dissertation could generate new insights with research designs tailored towards capturing the perceptions of neighborhood residents. In chapters one and two, interviews with community members are essential in understanding the level of accountability that leaders face, either through elections or collective social pressure. Similar sit-downs with political campaigns may also yield new insights about how campaigns judge the performance of certain neighborhoods and how much they rely on polling place electoral results.

Intersectional identity dynamics undoubtedly play a role in how social leaders filter community interests, but my dissertation lacks complete data on race, gender, disability, youth, and sexual orientation. Given the role these identities play in Colombia's pandemic protest movement (*el Paro*) and the racial dynamics surrounding the ongoing conflict, exploring these factors will result in a more complete picture of how diverse groups use brokers to connect with the state and political candidates.

While data from Colombia shows that the type of social leader varies within the same formal institution and the same area of the country, future work should explore what kinds of institutional and contextual factors explain variation in type. In interviews with communal action board leaders, respondents pointed to factors like the ability to receive social-responsibility grants from private corporations attempting to offset their environmental impact and the sheer distance between rural communities and areas of political power as two important areas determining their connection with political candidates. Other factors like the social capital of the community, migration and displacement, the presence of competing sources of community leadership, or long-term effects of violence may influence the ability for community members to hold social leaders accountable.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

A.1 Discrete-choice Experiment:

Introduction Script: *Communal Action Board presidents like you are often approached by a number of candidates before an election asking for your endorsement and help mobilizing voters in upcoming elections. We want to understand how neighborhood social leaders like you decide which candidates to endorse, and we'd like your help. We'll show you pairs of people who could be running for state assembly seats in Magdalena and some information about them. For each pair, we'd like you to tell us which candidate you would endorse. You'll see six different pairs of candidates.*

A.2 Pairwise Comparisons

Would you prefer to support a candidate that [Insert characteristic] or [Insert characteristic]?

Table A.1: Candidate Attributes

Attribute	**Values**
Did the candidate win the last elections that s/he ran in?	Yes No
Are other CABs in the area supporting this candidate?	Yes Not yet decided
The candidate has a lot of income?	Yes, products of a business they manage No
Has the candidate made promises about benefits for this neighborhood?	Has promised to finance a program of your choice None
Has the candidate made any promises about individual benefits for the president of the CAB?	Yes, will provide particular benefits No
Is there an investigation open against the candidate on questions of political integrity?	None An investigation was closed due to lack of evidence There is an open investigation

Table A.2: Pairwise Comparisons

Characteristics
1) Had a good likelihood of winning
2) Had a reputation for not being corrupt
3) Promised particular benefits to supporters
4) Promised to finance a project in your neighborhood

A.3 Interview Questions:

These questions were substantially shortened to increase response rates in the new over-the-phone format.

Table A.3: Section I: Personal Characteristics

Charge	[President, Vice president]
Neighborhood Size	*Approximately how many people live in this neighborhood?*
Membership Size	*Approximately how many people are members of the CAB?*

Table A.4: Section II: Neighborhood Type

Pressing needs	*What are some of the biggest issues facing this neighborhood?*
Public Service Provision	*Does your neighborhood lack the following services? Water, Individually-metered electricity, Sewage, Paved Roads*

Table A.5: Section III: Election Questions

Are you running for re-election?	[Yes, No, Not sure]
Is anyone running against you?	[Yes, No, Not sure]

Table A.6: Section IV: Open Answer Questions

History of leadership	*How did you come to be a neighborhood leader?*
Requests	*Do the people in your neighborhood ask you for help with things? What kind of requests do you receive from the residents of the neighborhood? Can you usually help them or are the requests not reasonable?*
Mobilization	*During the national and territorial elections, do you help voters in your neighborhood get to the polls? How many people can you usually mobilize? In your experience, are there benefits to working with political candidates?*
Government Opinion	*Do you think the people in the city government value your opinions and knowledge about things that happen in your neighborhood?*
Re-election	*What do you think matters for getting re-elected as a CAB leader?*
COVID 19	*Is there a role for social leaders like you in controlling the spread and effects of the Coronavirus?*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bibliography

Arjona, A. (2016). *Rebelocracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Auerbach, A. M. (2016). Clients and communities: The political economy of party network organization and development in india's urban slums. *World Politics*, 68(1):111–148.

Auerbach, A. M. (2017). Neighborhood associations and the urban poor: India's slum development committees. *World Development*, 96:119–135.

Auyero, J. (2000). The logic of clientelism in Argentina: An ethnographic account. *Latin American research review*, pages 55–81.

Baldwin, K. (2013). Why vote with the chief? political connections and public goods provision in zambia. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4):794–809.

Baldwin, K. (2018). Elected MPs, traditional chiefs, and local public goods: Evidence on the role of leaders in co-production from rural zambia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(12):1925–1956.

Baldwin, K. and Holzinger, K. (2019). Traditional political institutions and democracy: Reassessing their compatibility and accountability. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(12):1747–1774.

Baldwin, K. and Mvukiyehe, E. (2015). Elections and collective action: Evidence from changes in traditional institutions in liberia. *World Politics*, 67(4):690–725.

Binswanger-Mkhize, H. P. and de Regt, J. P., editors (2010). *Local and Community Driven Development*. The World Bank.

Bosancianu, C. M., Garcia-Hernandez, A., and Humphreys, M. (2019). Promises and pitfalls of consultative processes in development. Berlin Social Science Center.

Bowles, J., Larreguy, H., and Liu, S. (2020). How weakly institutionalized parties

monitor brokers in developing democracies: Evidence from postconflict liberia. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Brierley, S. and Nathan, N. L. (2019). The connections of party brokers. *Journal of Politics*.

Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., and Stokes, S. C. (2004). Vote buying in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review*, 39(2):66–88.

Buntaine, M. T., Daniels, B., and Devlin, C. (2018). Can information outreach increase participation in community-driven development? a field experiment near bwindi national park, uganda. *World Development*, 106:407–421.

Calvo, E. and Murillo, M. V. (2013). When parties meet voters: Assessing political linkages through partisan networks and distributive expectations in Argentina and Chile. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(7):851–882.

Camp, E. (2017). Cultivating effective brokers: A party leader's dilemma. *British Journal of Political Science*, 47(3):521–543.

Camp, E., Dixit, A., and Stokes, S. (2014). Catalyst or cause? legislation and the demise of machine politics in britain and the united states. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 39(4):559–592.

Caro, D. (2019). Delitos y riesgos electorales en el cesar. *El Pilón*.

Chang, H. I. (2017). "i can't do it if you're watching" monitoring and reciprocity in clientelism. *The Social Science Journal*, 54(2):191–205.

Cruz, C., Labonne, J., and Querubin, P. (2017). Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: Evidence from the philippines. *American Economic Review*, 107(10):3006–37.

Díaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B., and Ruiz-Euler, A. (2014). Traditional governance, citizen engagement, and local public goods: Evidence from mexico. *World Development*, 53:80–93.

Faller, J. K. (2015). The system matters: corruption and vote choice in uganda. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 53(4):428–456.

Fergusson, L., Molina, C., and Riaño, J. (2017). I sell my vote, and so what? A new database and evidence from Colombia. *Documentos CEDE*.

Gottlieb, J. (2017). Explaining variation in broker strategies: A lab-in-the-field experiment in senegal. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(11):1556–1592.

Hainmueller, J., Hopkins, D. J., and Yamamoto, T. (2014). Causal inference in

conjoint analysis: Understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments. *Political analysis*, 22(1):1–30.

Hicken, A. (2011). Clientelism. *Annual review of political science*, 14:289–310.

Holland, A. C. and Palmer-Rubin, B. (2015). Beyond the machine: clientelist brokers and interest organizations in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(9):1186–1223.

Jimeno, A. M. (2018). Así fue el fraude electoral de Aida Merlano. *El Espectador*.

Knight, A. and Pansters, W. G. (2005). *Caciquismo in twentieth-century Mexico*. Inst of Latin American Studies.

Koter, D. (2013). King makers: Local leaders and ethnic politics in Africa. *World Politics*, 65(2):187–232.

Kramon, E. (2016). Electoral handouts as information: Explaining unmonitored vote buying. *World Politics*, 68(3):454–498.

Larreguy, H., Marchall, J., and Querubín, P. (2016). Parties, brokers, and voter mobilization: How turnout buying depends upon the party's capacity to monitor brokers. *American Political Science Review*, 110(1):160–179.

Larreguy, H., Marshall, J., and Querubin, P. (2014). What is the effect of turnout buying? theory and evidence from mexico. *Harvard University (Cambridge, MA). Unpublished manuscript*.

Lawson, C. and Greene, K. F. (2014). Making clientelism work: How norms of reciprocity increase voter compliance. *Comparative Politics*, 47(1):61–85.

Lee, M. M. and Zhang, N. (2017). Legibility and the informational foundations of state capacity. *The Journal of Politics*, 79(1):118–132.

Levine, J. R. (2021). *Constructing Community: Urban Governance, Development, and Inequality in Boston*. Princeton University Press.

Madajewicz, M., Tompsett, A., and Habib, A. (2017). Community participation in decision-making—evidence from an experiment in safe drinking water provision in bangladesh. Technical report, Working Paper.

Mainwaring, S. (2006). *The crisis of democratic representation in the Andes*. Stanford University Press.

Mansuri, G. and Rao, V. (2012). *Localizing Development*. The World Bank.

Mares, I. and Visconti, G. (2019). Voting for the lesser evil: evidence from a

conjoint experiment in romania. *Political Science Research and Methods*, pages 1–14.

Mares, I. and Young, L. (2016a). Buying, expropriating, and stealing votes. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19:267–288.

Mares, I. and Young, L. (2016b). Buying, expropriating, and stealing votes. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19:267–288.

Ministerio del Interior (2019). Organizaciones de Acción Comunal (OAC). Web.

Misión de Observación Electoral (2018). 111 puestos de votación con risgos electorales en bogotá. Web.

Muñoz, P. (2014). An informational theory of campaign clientelism: The case of peru. *Comparative Politics*, 47(1):79–98.

Murtazashvili, J. B. (2016). *Informal order and the state in Afghanistan*. Cambridge University Press.

Nathan, N. L. (2019). Electoral consequences of colonial invention: Brokers, chiefs, and distribution in northern ghana. *World Politics*, 71(3):417–456.

Nichter, S. and Peress, M. (2017). Request fulfilling: When citizens demand clientelist benefits. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(8):1086–1117.

Novaes, L. M. (2018). Disloyal brokers and weak parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1):84–98.

Oliveros, V. (2016). Making it personal: Clientelism, favors, and the personalization of public administration in argentina. *Comparative Politics*, 48(3):373–391.

Palencia, P. S. (2013). Anatomía de la compra de votos en Barranquilla. *El Heraldo*.

Paller, J. W. (2014). Informal institutions and personal rule in urban ghana. *African Studies Review*, 57(3):123–142.

Read, B. (2012). *Roots of the state: Neighborhood organization and social networks in Beijing and Taipei*. Stanford University Press.

Rueda, M. R. (2017). Small aggregates, big manipulation: Vote buying enforcement and collective monitoring. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(1):163–177.

Schaffer, J. and Baker, A. (2015). Clientelism as persuasion-buying: Evidence from latin america. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(9):1093–1126.

Schwab, E. (2017). Equity and empowerment in Medellín's informal settlements. *Built Environment*, 43(2):236–255.

Scott, J. C. (1998). *Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. Yale University Press.

Stokes, S. C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3):315–325.

Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., and Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Szwarcberg, M. (2012). Political parties and rallies in Latin America. *Party Politics*, 20(3):456–466.

Szwarcberg, M. (2015). *Mobilizing poor voters: Machine politics, clientelism, and social networks in Argentina*, volume 37. Cambridge University Press.

Tsai, L. L. (2007). *Accountability without democracy: Solidary groups and public goods provision in rural China*. Cambridge University Press.

Vaishnav, M. (2017). *When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics*. Yale University Press.

Valencia Agudelo, L. (2020). *Los Clanes Políticos que Mandan en Colombia*. Planeta.

Vargas, A. R. (2019). *Legacies of civil war: wartime rule and communal authority in rural Colombia*. PhD thesis, Yale.

White, H., Menon, R., and Waddington, H. (2018). Community-driven development: Does it build social cohesion or infrastructure? a mixed-method evidence synthesis. *LSHTM Research Online*.

Zarazaga, R. (2014). Brokers beyond clientelism: A new perspective through the argentine case. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 56(3):23–45.

Zucco, C., Batista, M., and Power, T. J. (2019). Measuring portfolio salience using the bradley–terry model: An illustration with data from brazil. *Research & Politics*, 6(1):205316801983208.